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Between Scylla and Charybdis: Charting
a Course to Reconcile the Duty of




It has been nearly a decade since the first cases of AIDS1 were
identified and recorded.2 Since then, an alarmingly high national
prevalence for the disease has been found,3 sufficient to elevate
AIDS to the position of the most feared disease of the Eighties. Nev-
ertheless, following the Fifth International Conference on AIDS held
in Montreal,4 an across the board consensus on the most appropriate
public health response to the disease is yet to emerge. Issues that
must be addressed include the prevention and cure of AIDS, confi-
dentiality of AIDS-related information, and the appropriateness of
past legislative responses, or the lack thereof, to AIDS.
Medically, the AIDS challenge currently lies on two fronts: pre-
vention and cure. Although there is a major ongoing effort to find a
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1. Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome. In 1982, a case definition of AIDS was for-
mulated by the Centers for Disease Control, which formed the basis of state reporting laws
and facilitated the acquisition of statistics about the prevalence of AIDS nationwide. In 1987,
a new case definition was devised to include wasting syndrome and central nervous system
malfunctions. See Revision of the CDC Surveillance Case Definition for Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. (Supp. 15, Aug. 14,
1987).
2. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY
VIRUS EPIDEMIC I (1988) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION] (referring to cases of
AIDS in 1980). In retrospect, the Centers for Disease Control now recognizes one U.S. case of
AIDS occurring in 1979. See Gibofsky & Laurence, AIDS: Current Medical and Scientific
Aspects, 9 J. LEG. MED. 497 (1988).
3. The prevalence of a disease is the total number of existing cases. PRESIDENTIAL COM-
MISSION, supra note 2, at 1.
4. At a lunch prior to the opening of the Conference, Assistant U.S. Secretary for
Health, James Mason, said that the U.S. was far from resolving the challenges created by the
epidemic. See N.Y. Times, June 5, 1989, at B4, col. 1.
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cure for the disease, it is likely that a widely available cure or vac-
cine will not be developed for some time. 5 Vaccines are difficult to
develop because the protein surface of the virus continually changes.6
Consequently, treatment at present is focussed on alleviating or
preventing the opportunistic infections 7 that attack the system due to
the immune deficiency of the person caused by the AIDS virus,
HIV.
8
Prevention through education has been targeted as an important
method of combating AIDS. 9 Although there is some degree of con-
sensus that certain traditional public health responses are inappro-
priate in the context of AIDS, some disparity exists between the
views of those who cling to an exclusively long-term prevention phi-
losophy and those who would combine long-term with short-term
measures. These approaches are respectively global responses and in-
dividualized responses, with the former relying solely on general and
widespread educational efforts aimed at behavior modification to
lessen the likelihood of transmission of the virus."0
At the federal level, such general educational efforts were late
in arriving,1" but in 1988 Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, M.D.
mailed an information letter on AIDS to every household in the
U.S." As clearly desirable as this initiative was, few would argue
that this is as far as governments or public health agencies need to
go to combat the spread of the disease. Indeed, all states have at the
5. Very few advances were aired at the Fifth International Conference on AIDS that
would offer immediate hope to AIDS sufferers. Stayer, New HIV Treatments Look Promising,
AM. MED. NEWS, June 23/30, 1989, at 1.
6. REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON ACQUIRED IM-
MUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME, May 11, 1988, at 6 [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
7. For example, AZT and aerosol pentamadine to prevent Pneumocystis carinii pneumo-
nia. In addition to aerosol pentamadine, only three other AIDS drugs have been released under
the IND program: trimetrexate, ganciclovir, and recombinant human erythropoietin. AM.
MED. NEWS, July 14, 1989, at 5.
8. HIV is the abbreviation for the human immunodeficiency virus. See 232 SCIENCE 697
(1986).
9.. In 1988, the National Academy of Science stated that, "Educational efforts to foster
and sustain behavioral change remain the only presently available means to stem the spread of
HIV infection." INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, CONFRONTING
AIDS: UPDATE 1988, at 43 (1988).
10. Individualized responses generally focus on counselling and warnings to specific per-
sons, but may also involve segregation or the use of penal sanctions.
II. By 1985, there was sufficient knowledge about the virus to indicate at least its poten-
tial dangerousness and basic epidemiology. See Dr. Francis: Playing Catch-up in U.S. Fight
Against AIDS, AM. MED. NEWS, May 19, 1989, at 20. The 100th Congress enacted the
Health Omnibus Programs Extension Act of 1988, which directs $1.2 billion toward AIDS
treatment, services, and research. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-300aaa-13 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1989).
12. One hundred seven million copies of the booklet were issued. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVICES, UNDERSTANDING AIDS (1988).
AIDS
very least added AIDS to the list of diseases that must be reported
to state public health agencies.' 3
The confidentiality of AIDS-related information is a central is-
sue in any public health strategy for confronting AIDS. It directly
impinges on short-term, individualized prevention strategies, and
raises extremely delicate civil libertarian dilemmas. One person's
right to knowledge is another's breach of confidentiality. In this field
no federal initiative has yet come to fruition, 4 although federal laws
affecting confidentiality appear likely in the future. Congress has
specifically requested that the Public Health Service complete a fifty
state survey of all laws that affect the civil rights of AIDS patients.'5
Until recently, state laws addressing the issue of confidentiality
have been very inconsistent and often were drafted hastily.' 6 In the
past eighteen months, however, we have witnessed the passage of a
substantial number of state laws that display a much greater degree
of similarity in approach and philosophy. Nevertheless, there is little
evidence, empirical or otherwise, to support the correctness of these
responses, whose central objectives include the protection of vulnera-
ble individuals. These recent state statutes generally grant physicians
or state public health agencies the authority to warn parties who are
potentially at risk of transmission of the disease from a patient who
harbors the virus, but only a few statutes impose a duty to warn
upon those groups. This trend brings into focus another important
issue: whether states should require the reporting of cases of HIV
seropositivity (and possibly cases of AIDS-Related Complex (ARC))
as well as cases of AIDS. This Article seeks to analyze and evaluate
the different and alternative responses that states have adopted or
may adopt, and to persuade that some of the earlier, stricter ap-
proaches to confidentiality are better designed to further the explicit
or implicit aim of all statutes, which is to halt or impede the spread
of the disease.
13. See Curran, Clark & Gostin, AIDS: Legal and Policy Implications of the Applica-
tion of Traditional Disease Control Measures, 15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 27, 28-29
(1987) [hereinafter Traditional Disease Control Measures]. It is doubtful that such statutes
would be constitutionally objectionable.
14. The House of Representatives addressed the subject in the House bill entitled the
AIDS Federal Policy Act of 1988, but the final legislation omitted the confidentiality provi-
sions. See H.R. 5142, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H8073-76, H8081 (daily ed.
Sept. 23, 1988); see also infra notes 297-300, 319 and accompanying text.
15. Los Angeles Times, May 15, 1989.
16. A number of states, for example California and Florida, subsequently enacted new
laws. California's original statute was too strict regarding confidentiality, requiring the pa-
tient's consent before disclosure to any health care worker was permitted. See Who Knows
AIDS Status?, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 6, 1989, at 12.
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In states that have not yet legislated on the confidentiality issue,
a great deal of uncertainty currently exists as to the legal status of
warnings to third parties. Much of the seemingly analogous case law
suggests that a duty to warn may be imposed on physicians in many
instances, in stark contrast to the permissive mold of most statutes
that deal with confidentiality specifically in the AIDS context. Ironi-
cally, in an attempt to remove physicians from a legal dilemma, 7
some statutes have introduced much uncertainty to this issue. This
uncertainty may prove detrimental to any concerted public health
initiative.
Pennsylvania ranks seventh in the nation in the number of re-
ported cases of AIDS each year." Despite this, there is no Pennsyl-
vania statute addressing the confidentiality of AIDS-related informa-
tion. There is, however, a bill before the state legislature that would
incorporate many of the permissive features of contemporary stat-
utes. This bill, drafted by the Pennsylvania Bar Association and sup-
ported by the Pennsylvania branch of the American Civil Liberties
Union, incorporates the recommendations of the Report of the Penn-
sylvania Bar Association Task Force on Acquired Immune Defi-
ciency Syndrome, which was published in 1988.19 The Task Force
report included a recommendation that physicians should be granted
the power to disclose HIV antibody test results to known present
sexual partners of the infected individual as disclosed to the physi-
cian, and should be shielded from legal liability that might arise
from such disclosure.20
Section II of this Article summarizes the current epidemiology
of the disease, its developmental stages and variations, and the avail-
able testing procedures for detection of the AIDS virus. Section III
looks at a selected group of popular and traditional public health
strategies and their appropriateness to AIDS. Section IV considers
analogous areas of case law pertaining to confidentiality and duties
of disclosure and their applicability to the AIDS context. Section V
examines existing state statutory provisions that govern confidential-
ity and AIDS-related information. Section VI outlines the current
contact tracing programs of various state public health departments.
17. Many statutes remove the possibility of civil or criminal liability on the part of a
physician who warns a third party or fails to so warn. See infra notes 196-200 and accompany-
ing text.
18. See TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 12.
19. S. 1163, Printer's No. 1435, 173d Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1989). See also infra
notes 300-03 and accompanying text. The ACLU originally had its own separate draft bill,
which was very similar to the PBA's Bill. See TASK FORCE, supra note 6.
20. See TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 25.
AIDS
Section VII assesses the merits of requiring the mandatory reporting
of individuals who test HIV positive to state public health agencies.
Section VIII contains a critical appraisal of partner notification or
contact tracing policies by physicians or public health officials and
considers with whom the primary responsibility for notifying third
parties, if any, should rest. Section IX concludes the Article with
recommendations for reform generally and in Pennsylvania specifi-
cally, and assesses the role of judges in this field.
II. The Medical Facts Associated with AIDS and the Epidemiol-
ogy of the Disease
In late 1980 sporadic cases of exceptional disease manifestations
attracted the attention of physicians across the nation. Shortly there-
after, the concept of AIDS emerged, a disease that demolishes the
body's defensive mechanisms and is invariably fatal.21
As of September 1988, 111,854 cases of AIDS had been offi-
cially reported to the World Health Organization's Global Pro-
gramme on AIDS from a total of 140 countries.22 A total of 80,994
of those cases were reported from the Americas, 71,171 from the
United States alone.23 The reported cases from the Americas consti-
tuted approximately seventy-five percent of all the reported cases,
with Europe and Africa comprising thirteen percent of the total.'
Since the first actual reports of AIDS in early 1981,25 the dis-
ease has developed at a rapid rate. Over 66,000 cases of AIDS were
reported to the Centers for Disease Control between June 1, 1981
and July 4, 1988.26 By December 1982, 878 cases of AIDS were
officially reported; by August 20, 1985 this figure had risen to
12,599.27 As of August 1989, 105,990 cases of AIDS had been re-
ported in the U.S. and 61,655 deaths had occurred. A recent com-
21. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION,.supra note 2, at 1.
22. AIDS in the UK and Worldwide, THE LANCET, Oct. 22, 1988, at 976.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See CDC, Pneumocystis Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 250-52 (1981); CDC, Kaposi's Sarcoma and Pneumocystis Pneumonia
Amongst Homosexual Men-New York City and California, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 305-08 (1981).
26. Distribution of AIDS Cases, by Racial/Ethnic Group and Exposure Category,
United States, June 1, 1981 - July 4, 1988, 261 J. A.M.A. 201-05 (1989) [hereinafter
Distribution].
27. See Education and Foster Care of Children Infected with Human T-Lymphotropic
Virus Type III Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 517 (1985).
28. REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON ACQUIRED IM-
MUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME, Nov. I1, 1989 (inside cover) (citing AIDS Clinical Care, Oct.
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mentary projected that by 1993, a total of 450,000 cases of AIDS
will have been diagnosed in the United States.29
In Pennsylvania, from June 1981 to April 11, 1988, 1495 cases
of AIDS were diagnosed, 732 in the last year alone (April 1987 to
April 1988).30 Only six states have reported a higher number of di-
agnosed AIDS cases; in that approximately seven year period, the
states of New York and California alone accounted for over forty-
seven percent of AIDS cases.31
Further, the virus32 that causes the disease is present in a much
larger number of cases, although the precise figure cannot be known.
One to one-and-a-half million people are estimated to be currently
affected in the U.S."3 To date only a tiny percentage of the popula-
tion has been tested for exposure to the HIV virus.
AIDS patients tend to be disproportionately black (26%) and
Hispanic (13 % ) relative to the percentage of blacks (12 % ) and His-
panics (6%) in the general population.3' In fact, among certain sub-
populations of AIDS patients, blacks and Hispanics dominate the
percentages of sufferers. Seventy-five percent of children suffering
from AIDS are black or Hispanic, and seventy percent of cases in
women and in heterosexual men involve blacks or Hispanics, al-
though overall most AIDS patients are non-Hispanic whites.35
The largest category of AIDS patients is the homosexual or bi-
sexual male category, which accounts for more than two-thirds of all
reported cases.36 Eighty-five percent of all cases of AIDS in whites
occur in this category, 37 with sixty-five percent of the cases having
no history of intravenous ("IV") drug abuse.38 Ninety-seven percent
of all adult AIDS patients can be placed in groups that suggest a
possible means of disease acquisition. Adult individuals with hemo-
philia or other coagulation disorders comprise one percent of all
cases, and male blood transfusion recipients comprise two percent.39
1989, Vol. 1, No. 6).
29. 450,000 AIDS Cases Seen by '93, Wash. Post, June 5, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
30. See TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at Appendix D-I, at 2.
31. Id. at 2.
32. In this Article, the virus concerned will be termed HIV although it has been alterna-
tively dubbed human T-lymphotropic virus type III (HTLV-II1/LAV), Lymphadenopathy-as-
sociated virus (LAV), and AIDS-associated retrovirus (ARV). See 232 SCIENCE 697 (1986).
33. Quarterly Report to the Domestic Policy Council on the Prevalence and Rate of
Spread of HIV and AIDS in the United States, 259 J. A.M.A. 2657 (1988).




38. Id. at 202.
39. See AIDS and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States: 1988
AIDS
Over half of all affected women have a history of intravenous drug
abuse,40 and another eleven percent were transfusion recipients.41
Sixteen percent of affected women had male sex partners with a his-
tory of IV drug abuse, and another five percent were born in coun-
tries known to be associated with high risk, such as Haiti. Three and
seven-tenths percent of affected women had male sex partners who
were bisexual, and two and two-tenths percent of affected women
had male sex partners with HIV infection but undetermined means
of acquiring it."2 The incidence of AIDS for males is thirteen times
greater than for females.43 Only one-half of one percent of all af-
fected males were heterosexual and were not intravenous drug users,
but had high risk sexual partners.
The HIV virus, the causative agent for AIDS, attacks the T-
helper cells, lymphocytes, resulting in lytic infection." As a conse-
quence, the body is unable to resist the attack or mount an immune
response against opportunistic infections or developing malignancies.
Although antibodies do develop to several of the HIV proteins fol-
lowing infection, they are not generally protective in the same way
as they are with other viral infections." HIV has been isolated in
blood, semen, vaginal secretions, tears, and saliva. It appears, how-
ever, that the virus has an insufficient concentration in tears and sa-
liva to produce infection.'6 To date the virus has been shown to be
spread by sexual contact, by parenteral exposure to blood (often
through IV drug abuse), perinatally to the fetus or infant and, in
limited instances, by other exposures to blood.' 7 The virus is not
transmitted through casual contact.
Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP) 48  is the most
Update, 38 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 17 (Supp. May 12, 1989) (Table 1).
40. See Distribution, supra note 26, at 202.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States: A Review of Cur-
rent Knowledge, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 10 (Supp. Dec. 18, 1987).
44. See Closen, Connor, Kaufman & Wojcik, AIDS: Testing Democracy-Irrational
Responses to the Public Health Crisis and the Need for Privacy in Serologic Testing, 19 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 835, 859 (1986).
45. Francis & Chin, The Prevention of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in the
United States, 257 J. A.M.A. 1357 (1987).
46. Curran, Jaffe, Hardy, Morgan, Selik & Dondero, Epidemiology of HIV Infection
and AIDS in the United States, 239 SCIENCE 610, 615 (1988).
47. Public Health Service Guidelines for Counselling and Antibody Testing to Prevent
HIV Infection and AIDS, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 509-15 (1987).
48. PCP is an opportunistic infection, see infra note 49, caused by a parasite commonly
present in the normal population. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 200. PCP is
most frequently diagnosed in AIDS patients, and is life-threatening to them. Id.
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common opportunistic disease reported among AIDS patients."9 Ap-
proximately one-third of all AIDS patients die of cancer, frequently
Kaposi's sarcoma,50 or one of the lymphomas.51 The only treatment
currently in widespread use that has demonstrated significant utility
is AZT (Zidovudine), which has been approved for patients with
AIDS or for HIV infected persons who have a T4 cell count 2 below
200.
The Centers for Disease Control has developed a classification
system for HIV infected persons.54 Such persons are placed in one of
four different groups, at any particular point in time. A person who
develops symptoms of acute infection shortly after exposure to the
virus is classified as CDC I. Persons classified as CDC II are in the
asymptomatic stage. Sufferers allocated to group CDC III are
asymptomatic apart from persistent generalized lymphade-
nopathy-they have not developed symptoms of full blown AIDS al-
though their immune system is obviously malfunctioning. CDC IV
embraces persons with symptomatic HIV infection falling into five
separate sub-categories, including persons suffering from what has
traditionally been termed AIDS-Related Complex (ARC)55 and
those suffering from opportunistic infections, certain malignancies,
or neurological manifestations attributable to the AIDS virus.56
It was initially believed that many persons who contracted HIV
infection would not go on to develop life-threatening AIDS. Medical
experts seemed to agree that the chances of HIV infections develop-
ing into AIDS were between twenty-five and fifty percent.57 At that
time it was believed that the incubation period for the disease was
between six months and seven years. It is now widely believed that
49. "An opportunistic infection is an infection caused by an organism that rarely causes
disease in persons with normal immune systems but attacks immunosuppressed patients."
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 199. Immunosuppression is the artificial preven-
tion or diminution of the immune response. Id. at 198.
50. Kaposi's sarcoma is a cancer or tumor of the blood and/or lymphatic vessel walls.
id.
51. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 9.
52. T-cells mature in the thymus gland and subsets of them perform a variety of special-
ized functions within the immune system. Id. at 200. T-lymphocytes are found primarily in the
blood, lymph, and lymphoid organs. Id. A T4 cell count is a measure of the state of the
immune system based on the number of T4 lymphocytes present in the blood. Id.
53. Id.
54, Id. at 7-8.
55. Patients with ARC experience generalized symptoms such as fever, weight loss, fa-
tigue, and diarrhea.
56. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 8.
57. Comment, AIDS: Balancing the Physician's Duty to Warn and Confidentiality Con-
cerns, 38 EMORY L.J 279, 282-83 (1989).
AIDS
the actual incubation period may be substantially longer. 8 As a con-
sequence, the fatality rate of HIV infection may be significantly
higher than was initially surmised. A recent study of homosexual
males suggests that every person infected with the virus will ulti-
mately develop AIDS.5 9
The test currently used to detect HIV infection is the ELISA °
test. After two successive positive ELISA tests, confirmation of the
diagnosis is made by the use of a Western Blot test.6 ' In fact, neither
test identifies the HIV virus itself. Both tests merely detect antibo-
dies to the virus. The Western Blot test detects antibodies to proteins
of a specific molecular weight.
The ELISA test is a screening test that was initially developed
to test blood donors. The test is extremely sensitive and produces
frequent instances of false positive results;6" it is not an adequate
diagnostic tool. The Western Blot test is more accurate than the
ELISA, producing far fewer false positives. Because these tests de-
tect antibodies to the HIV virus rather than the virus itself, the tests
also produce false negatives since they register a negative result dur-
ing the period of seroconversion, the period during which antibodies
are actually in the process of production following an exposure to the
virus. It was originally thought that this seroconversion period lasted
at most between three and six months. Recent evidence, however,
suggests it may last for as long as three years.6" Thus, considerable
scope exists for error in HIV testing, aside from the ever-present
possibility of human mistakes in interpreting test results.64 Several
tests have been developed that actually detect the genetic material of
the virus itself, but none of these antigen tests has come into wide-
spread use, partly due to their prohibitive cost.65
58. See Discussion Draft of the American Bar Ass'n AIDS Co-ordinating Committee,
AIDS: THE LEGAL ISSUES 11-12 (1988) [hereinafter AIDS].
59. Lui, Durrow & Rutherford, A Model-Based Estimate of the Mean Incubation Pe-
riod for AIDS in Homosexual Men, 240 SCIENCE 1333, 1334 (1988).
60. ELISA is an acronym for enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay.
61. Sometimes these tests are also followed by a T-cell test, which assesses the level of
T-cells in the system. When the count is low this is very strong evidence that the immune
system has been damaged by the H1V virus.
62. Although the sensitivity of the test is high-i.e., the test will detect virtually every
infected person-its specificity is less accurate. A significant number of those who do not have
the virus will nevertheless register as infected. In particular, the ELISA test is sensitive to
humidity and temperature. See Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, Screening for HIV Infection:
Risks, Benefits, and the Burden of Proof, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 259, 261 (1986).
63. See Silent AIDS, TIME, June 12, 1989, at 61.
64. There is room for significant disagreement in the interpretation of marginal Western
Blot tests. See AIDS Test Examined, 308 THE ECONOMiST 70 (1988).
65. For example, the Cetus test, id. at 71. A "polymerase chain reaction" test has also
been developed. See Abraham, Longer Latency Period Poses Questions About HIV Tests, AM.
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None of these tests are diagnostic or prognostic of AIDS itself,
the fatal disease that often results from HIV infection. Indeed,
AIDS is not a discrete clinical entity. It consists of a diagnosis based
on the existence of certain symptoms raising a presumption that this
was the result of the body's immune system being wholly or partially
disabled by the HIV virus. The case definition of AIDS was recently
revised by the CDC for reporting purposes."6
III. Traditional Public Health Measures
Traditional disease control methods, aside from contact trac-
ing, 67 include quarantine, mandatory testing, application of the crim-
inal law, and mandatory reporting of diseases to public health
agencies.
Quarantining and segregating individuals with contagious dis-
eases has been a major tool, sometimes the major tool in the control
of disease. It is a strategy that has been employed for many years. 8
When the disease was curable, sufferers were usually quarantined
until they were cured. If it was incurable, segregation would usually
be lifelong, e.g., in leper colonies. Such laws have been used to quar-
antine not only those actually suffering from a contagious disease,
but also those merely suspected of affliction."'
Even assuming the constitutionality of any law providing for the
quarantining of AIDS patients or carriers of the HIV virus, such a
law is unlikely to significantly further the public health objective of
preventing the spread of AIDS. In view of the serious civil liberta-
MED. NEWS, June 24, 1988, at 30.
66. See Revision of the CDC Surveillance Case Definition for Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome, 36 MORBIDITY & MORALITY WEEKLY REP. (Supp. IS, Aug. 14,
1987).
67. Contact tracing essentially involves identifying and notifying persons who have had
contact with an infected person that puts them at risk of contracting a disease. See infra notes
201-58 and accompanying text.
68. The Biblical book of Leviticus reported that lepers were subject to quarantine. Levit-
icus 1346 (New American Standard); Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an
Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOESTRA L. REV. 53, 55 (1985). See also Gregory, AIDS - The Lep-
rosy of the 1980's: Is There a Case for Quarantine?, 9 J. LEG. MED. 547, 549-51 (1988).
Strictly speaking, the term "quarantine" is applied to persons who have been exposed to a
disease but have yet to develop symptoms of it, whereas "segregation" applies to persons mani-
festing symptoms of the disease. In this context the words are used generally to refer to isola-
tion of individuals and not in their correct technical sense. The first reported local quarantine
order in the United States was made in 1622 in East Hampton, Long Island, because of small-
pox. Parmet, supra, at 56.
69. A. BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE IN THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1880, at 85 (1985) [hereinafter No MAGIC BULLET]. For example,
prostitutes were quarantined around the time of World War I on the presumption that they
had venereal disease. Id. at 84-92.
AIDS
rian implications of such a measure, this available alternative ought
to be left on ice as long as the current epidemiology of the disease
does not alter drastically.
Those carriers of the HIV virus who have not yet developed any
symptoms of AIDS are equally as great a risk, if not more so due to
their more active status, to third parties in contact with them. Such
persons also should be isolated if the measure is to achieve a real
preventive effect.7" Yet, such persons are by virtue of their asympto-
matology not readily identifiable. Isolating only those persons who
have tested HIV positive would be to ignore those HIV carriers who
have not been tested. Without mandatory testing, the latter would
remain anonymous and there would be a very serious breach in the
integrity of the approach as a whole. To test every person and quar-
antine all those with the HIV virus would be an astronomically ex-
pensive and time-consuming process. Such isolation would have to be
lifelong for the majority of those isolees. In addition, a significant
number of persons would be unnecessarily quarantined because of
false positive test results. Others would not be quarantined despite
the fact that they were carriers because of false negative test results.
It is also possible that such segregation would, by repeatedly
exposing infected individuals to the virus, hasten the onset of AIDS
itself. In Jew Ho v. Williamson,71 a court held unlawful a city's ac-
tion in quarantining a large section of the city in an attempt to curb
the rapid spread of bubonic plague, in part because the disease
would spread rapidly within the unduly large quarantined
population .72
Moreover, the available data strongly and unequivocally sug-
gests that the HIV virus is not casually transmitted.73 The disease is
only passed on as a consequence of engaging in certain specific be-
haviors. This is in stark contrast to the highly contagious nature of
many of the diseases in which quarantine has been utilized in the
past.74
70. It is estimated that between one and two million Americans are presently infected
with the virus or have been exposed to it. See Krim, AIDS: The Challenge to Science and
Medicine, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (1985). Because of the number of unidentifiable carri-
ers of the virus, any quarantine measure applied simply to persons with AIDS is unlikely to
satisfy the requirement of a "legitimate state objective." See Gregory, supra note 68, at 556-
57.
71. 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
72. Id. at 15, 22.
73. Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 36
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 3 (Supp. 2, 1987).
74. These diseases were often transmitted through contaminated food or drinking water;
for example, cholera and typhoid. Tuberculosis is an airborne disease.
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Despite the limitations of the quarantine option, a number of
states have gone as far as drafting laws containing quarantine mea-
sures directed at HIV-infected persons based on that status alone,
although none as yet have reached the statute books. In 1985, the
Texas Board of Health advocated a rule that would have expanded
the state's register of quarantinable diseases to include AIDS.7" Cali-
fornia voters rejected a similar measure in a 1986 referendum.7 s
The majority of states that have enacted quarantine legislation
with respect to AIDS or HIV have legislated "behavior-based" ap-
proaches, permitting isolation as a last resort when an individual
who knows of his infectious status refuses to desist from engaging in
activities carrying a high risk of transmission. Alabama, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Oregon have such provi-
sions. 7 Other states have schemes permitting the segregation of sex-
ually transmitted or contagious disease carriers, which would pre-
sumably embrace instances of AIDS or HIV carrier status.s
Despite these few exceptional cases, most states have shunned
the quarantine option. A Pennsylvania Code provision states that
quarantining is not required for AIDS.7
Universal mandatory testing or screening is frequently noted as
a methodology for ensuring precise and accurate data on the devel-
oping epidemiology of the disease, and as a possible preliminary
measure to the utilization of the quarantine option. Realistic propos-
als, however, are targeted at specific populations. Mandatory screen-
ing is already a reality for all Defense Department recruits, for all
potential immigrants to the U.S., and for State Department foreign
service personnel."0 The Federal Bureau of Prisons and fourteen
states," have mandatory screening programs for prison inmates, and
the courts have permitted prison officials wide discretion in control-
ling inmates who have AIDS."2 Courts are less accommodating to
75. See Traditional Disease Control Measures, supra note 13, at 31.
76. Id.; see also Californians to Vote on Adding AIDS to Disease List, I AIDS POL'Y
& LAW (BNA) 4 (July 2, 1986).
77. Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS: Legislative and Regulatory
Policy in the United States, 261 J. A.M.A. 1621, 1626 & 1630 n.108 (1989).
78. Id. at 1626 & 1630 nn.109-10.
79. 28 PA. CODE § 27.101a(e) (1987).
80. One court has upheld these State and Defense Departments' policies and practices.
Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.D.C.
1987) (district court denied union's motion for preliminary injunction, stating that "the pros-
pects of success on the merits are slight").
81. As of November 1988.
82. Cf. Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9, 10-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Prisons, however,
are swiftly moving away from mass mandatory screening programs. See Sinkfield & Houser,
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mandatory testing in other contexts, such as the workplace."3
Screening of persons donating blood, reproductive tissue, or or-
gans is clearly unobjectionable and widely practiced. The most con-
tentious areas involve pregnant women, protection of health care per-
sonnel, and pre-marital testing. Difficulties arise in any screening
program of low-risk populations, such as potential spouses. Apart
from the astronomically high cost of screening large numbers of per-
sons,84 testing low risk populations is potentially likely to yield large
numbers of false positive results while uncovering only a tiny per-
centage of the total HIV infection in the general population.85 De-
spite this, mandatory screening of marriage applicants is a reality in
many states, including Illinois.8 In Texas, premarital screening will
become compulsory when the prevalence of HIV infection in the
state tops 0.83 % of the population.8 7 In Pennsylvania, state officials
are currently considering the desirability of premarital screening:
Creating a specific offense of knowingly, recklessly, or negli-
gently transmitting the HIV virus would avoid many of the problems
of applying existing criminal offenses to this form of conduct, but
cannot be viewed as a central facet of any general prevention strat-
egy. While it is desirable to criminalize flagrant conduct, the crimi-
nal law becomes less effective when dealing with more marginal con-
duct. A number of states have legislated to render it an offense to
knowingly expose another to the HIV virus.88 The excessive use of
criminal sanctions, however, threatens to victimize and alienate
many high-risk minority groups in society.
It is apparent that many of the orthodox disease prevention
AIDS and the Criminal Justice System, 10 J. LEG. MED. 103, 110-11 (1989).
83. See, e.g., Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, No. 87-0-830
(D. Neb. Mar. 29, 1988).
84. The authors of one article projected that the cost of testing the 3.8 million persons
who marry each year would be approximately $23 million plus $100 million for costs of coun-
selling. Cleary, Barry, Mayer, Brandt, Gostin & Fineberg, Compulsory Premarital Screening
for the Human Immunodeficiency Virus: Technical and Public Health Considerations, 258 J.
A.M.A. 1757, 1760 (1987).
85. Id. at 1759-60.
86. In Illinois, up until 1988, 44,726 marriage applicants were screened but only five
individuals tested positive to HIV antibodies. See Gostin, supra note 77, at 1625.
87. TEX. CIVIL STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, § 9.02(e) (Supp. 1989) (to be codified at TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 81.102).
88. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-601 (Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c) (1988).
A number of commentators recognize the limitations of such laws, particularly in relation to
sexual activity. See Field & Sullivan, AIDS and the Criminal Law, 15 LAW. MED. & HEALTH
CARE 46 (1987); Robinson, AIDS and the Criminal Law: Traditional Approaches and a New
Statutory Proposal, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91 (1985). One author estimates that 50 to 100
HIV-infected persons have been prosecuted for conduct likely to transmit the virus. See Gos-
tin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health and Civil Liberties, 49
OHIO ST. L. 1017, 1039 & n.115 (1989).
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methodologies have only limited utility in the AIDS context and
threaten to severely injure the privacy interests of large sections of
society if implemented rigidly or over-broadly. Let us now turn to
the role of warnings to third parties as a prevention strategy for
AIDS.
IV. Warnings: Analogous Precedents
In the absence of state legislation governing the confidentiality
of HIV antibody test results or AIDS or ARC status, courts in some
jurisdictions may be confronted with suits in which the allegation is
that a physician unlawfully failed to notify a person at risk from the
patient of the patient's medical status or intentions. In such in-
stances, courts will likely turn for guidance to existing case law on
warnings. Such cases have been spawned in two contexts: contagious
diseases and dangerous mental patients.
A. Contagious Diseases Authorities
A number of cases have held that a duty to warn potential vic-
tims of infectious diseases attaches to a physician who has a profes-
sional therapeutic relationship with the carrier. The cases embrace
numerous different disease entities including syphilis, scarlet fever,
smallpox, tuberculosis, and typhoid.
The earliest case of this type to reach a state supreme court was
Skillings v. Allen,89 decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
1919. In that case a doctor negligently advised the parents of a child
suffering from scarlet fever that they might safely visit him in the
hospital and also take him home without risk of infection. The court
held that the alleged facts stated a cause of action based on the phy-
sician's duty to inform the parents of the infectious nature of the
disease and the condition of their child.9"
The next case was Simonsen v. Swenson,91 decided by the Su-
preme Court of Nebraska in 1920. The patient, who was suffering
from syphilis, brought an action alleging a breach of the duty of
doctor-patient confidentiality by the doctor because the doctor re-
vealed to the operator of the hotel in which the plaintiff was staying
that the plaintiff had syphilis. 92 The court held that any breach of
89. 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919).
90. See id. at 325, 327-28, 173 N.W. at 663-64.
91. 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).
92. Id. at -, 177 N.W. at 831-32.
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the confidential relationship was privileged."s Interestingly, the court
assumed that the patient would necessarily understand that, when
the patient's disease is highly contagious, the doctor may disclose
information about the patient's illness, so that arguably not even a
prima facie breach of the patient's confidences arose.9
There are numerous other decisions to the same effect, notably
the Supreme Court of Arkansas' decision in Davis v. Rodman, 5 the
Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in Jones v. Stanko,96 and the Su-
preme Court of New York's decision in Wojcik v. Aluminum Com-
pany of America.9 7 In 1970, the Florida District Court of Appeals
held that the duty to warn family members of the contagious nature
of the patient's disease, tuberculosis, existed even though the physi-
cian had failed to initially diagnose the disease.98
In most of the above cases, the duty to warn or inform was
owed to family members, often the parents of the victim. The duty,
however, it is not limited to such relationships.99 Jones v. Stanko 100
involved a suit by the estate of a neighbor who died from smallpox
contracted from the physician's patient. The neighbor had specifi-
cally inquired of the physician whether it was safe to attend the pa-
tient during his illness and had received an affirmative response. 101
The plaintiff subsequently did attend the patient and even prepared
the decedent's body for burial. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that
a physician's failure to warn persons in proximity to a patient of the
patient's disease constituted negligence.102 In Simonsen v. Swen-
son,103 the court held that there was a duty to warn persons, other
than the patient's family, who live in close proximity to the patient,
of the patient's contagious condition.1' 4
It would seem, therefore, that the cases lend clear support to the
proposition that physicians owe a duty to warn persons who are in
93. Id. at -, 177 N.W. at 833.
94. Id. at -, 177 N.W. at 832.
95. 147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612 (1921).
96. 118 Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928).
97. 18 Misc. 2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1959).
98. Hofmann v. Blackman, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
99. In Earle v. Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (1953), the court held that when
a person lived in a first floor apartment and rented out a second floor apartment, the lessor
owed a duty to the unsuspecting potential tenant to disclose that she, her husband, and daugh-
ter were suffering from tuberculosis.
100. 118 Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928).
101. Id. at 148-49, 160 N.E. at 456.
102. Id. at 153-54, 160 N.E. at 458.
103. 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920) (recognizing a power to warn prevents the
physician's actions from amounting to a breach of physician-patient confidentiality).
104. Id. at - , 177 N.W. at 832.
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danger of contracting the HIV virus of the condition of the patient,
since AIDS is indeed another form of contagious disease. The cases
cited above, however, are generally characterized by the inability of
the patient either to adapt his conduct so as to avoid or minimize the
risk of infection or to communicate adequately to third parties the
nature of the risk. Many of the sufferers were minor children,' 0 5 and
most were seriously debilitated by their condition.
All of the diseases that were the subject of the above cases were
highly contagious. Unlike many of the diseases concerned above, the
AIDS virus seemingly cannot be communicated by touch, and it is
not an airborne disease. The virus, being essentially blood borne, can
be communicated only as a result of particular types of conduct.
Thus, the diseases involved in the decided cases created a higher risk
of transmission to a wider class of individuals than does AIDS.
In Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America"0 6 and Hofmann v.
Blackman,0 7 the sufferers were actually unaware of their conditions.
Additionally, the real complaint of a third party, as it was in Woj-
cik, often is that if he had been informed of the contagious condition
of the patient, he might have been able to seek a cure for the disease
in a timely fashion. 0 8 Yet, no cure presently exists for AIDS, so a
central traditional purpose of warning disappears when it is likely
that the third person has already contracted the virus at the relevant
point in time.
The diagnosis of positive HIV status is less accurate, even after
confirmatory testing, than the diagnosis of most other contagious dis-
eases. The existence of significant numbers of false positives, the
spreading of unnecessary alarm, and the resulting expected degree of
ostracism of the supposed sufferer are material factors in the AIDS
context.
Many of the distinctions drawn above suggest that AIDS cannot
easily and simply be considered just another contangious disease for
these purposes. Sufferers of many of the traditional forms of conta-
gious diseases seek help because of the highly debilitating effects of
their illness. Their disease status is more obvious and identifiable. By
contrast, carriers of the HIV virus may not be easily identifiable and
may not even be aware of their own illness. Testing is essential for
public health authorities to track the spread of the disease and to
105. E.g., Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919); Davis v. Rodman,
147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612 (1921).
106. 18 Misc. 2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1959).
107. 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
108. 18 Misc. 2d at 741, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
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encourage more responsible types of behavior from high risk groups.
If a duty to warn does exist, however, to whom is the duty
owed? In Gammill v. United States,'0 9 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals held, obiter, that the duty to warn-in this case, of the risk
of contracting hepatitis-could not be owed to persons of whom the
physician was totally unaware, specifically the babysitters in the case
before the court." 0
B. Dangerous Mental Patients Authorities: The Tarasoff Doctrine
The decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia' shook the psychotherapy community. It created a duty in
certain circumstances to breach the duty of confidentiality owed by a
psychotherapist to his patient. Although subjected to a barrage of
criticism from academic and professional circles," 2 the doctrine is
not only alive and well, it is flourishing.' 3 It is an exceptional deci-
sion when a state court refuses to adopt and apply the doctrine.""
The available case law in Pennsylvania appears to be ambivalent re-
garding the doctrine and further clarification is awaited.
In the Tarasoff case, the parents of Tatiana Tarasoff brought
an action against the University of California Regents, the psycho-
therapists at the University of California at Berkeley student health
center, and the campus police, after Prosenjit Poddar, a patient of
one of the psychotherapists, killed Tatiana." 5 Dr. Lawrence Moore,
a psychologist, saw Poddar on a number of occasions and diagnosed
him as an acute paranoid schizophrenic. During one of the therapy
109. 727 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1984).
110. Id. at 954.
111. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
112. See Curran, Confidentiality and the Prediction of Dangerousness in Psychiatry,
293 NEw ENG. J. MED. 285 (1975); Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to
Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REV. 358 (1976); Therapists and Threats, TIME, Jan. 20,
1975, at 56; California Court Limits Doctor-Patient Privilege, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1974, at
15, col. 1.
113. In Peck v. Counselling Serv. of Addison County, Inc., 146 Vt. 61, 499 A.2d 422
(1985), the Supreme Court of Vermont held that the doctrine could be relied upon to support
a duty to warn third parties in order to protect property loss.
114. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, in Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718,
415 A.2d 625 (1980), found no cause of action to exist in circumstances analogous to Tarasoff,
essentially because under Maryland law, it would have been a breach of privilege for a psycho-
therapist to disclose at a court hearing the patient's propensity for violence. Although the
Maryland privileged communications statute specified a number of exceptions to the general
principle, none were applicable to the facts of the case. In Furr v. Spring Grove State Hosp.,
53 Md. App. 474, 454 A.2d 414 (1983), Maryland courts again were confronted with the
application of the doctrine. Since there was no identifiable victim, however, the court declined
to decide the issue.
115. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 430, 551 P.2d 334, 339-40, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 19-20 (1976).
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sessions, Poddar confided to the therapist that he wished to kill a
female, who he did not identify by name, but who was nevertheless
readily identifiable as Tatiana Tarasoff. Dr. Moore alerted campus
police that Poddar was dangerous and stated his view that Poddar
should be committed to a psychiatric facility. The campus police
took Poddar into custody, but released him after he promised to stay
away from Tatiana. The defendants took no further action. Shortly
after his release, Poddar shot Tatiana with a pellet gun and stabbed
her repeatedly, causing her death.
The California Supreme Court determined that the Tarasoffs
stated a proper cause of action' 16 and that the psychotherapist owed
readily identifiable potential victims a duty to protect them from
foreseeable harm from a patient with whom he had a professional
relationship. 117 The court held that the duty arises whether or not
the therapist actually determined that the patient was a potential
source of danger to the third party." 8 If the therapist reasonably
should have so determined, a duty arises. Liability, based on what
was in fact an omission, was founded on section 315 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, which states that a duty may be owed to a
third party to protect the third party from harm arising out of the
special relationship between the defendant and another person. The
California court held that the psychotherapist-patient relationship
was such a special relationship for the purpose of warning third
parties. 1
Ironically, although sometimes this doctrine is relied upon to
furnish justification for a duty to warn potential third party victims
in the AIDS context, the only solid line of case law relied upon in
Tarasoff was in fact the aging contagious disease cases discussed
above.
The real issue left unanswered by the Tarasoff decision is how
identifiable the potential victim must be before a duty to warn arises.
It was clear from Tarasoff that the patient need not have provided
names if his hostility was clearly directed at a specific individual.
The Superior Court of New Jersey, in McIntosh v. Milano,2 ' en-
dorsed this approach. Yet, the Supreme Court of California, in
116. Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 348, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
117. Id. at 439, 551 P.2d at 345-46, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26.
118. Id. at 436-38, 551 P.2d at 344-45, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25.
119. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 436-38, 551 P.2d 334, 343-45,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23-25 (1976).
120. 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979).
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Thompson v. County of Alameda, ' 2  decided six years after
Tarasoff, made clear that no duty would arise to warn a community
when the patient was potentially dangerous to a whole community or
to a large section of, or a group within, the community. 122 There
must be a specific victim, or a very limited class of readily identifi-
able victims, for a duty to warn to exist.1
2 1
In one case, Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2' a federal dis-
trict court in Nebraska established a duty owed to a wide spectrum
of potential victims, the occupants of a night club. 2' Although this
represented an unusually liberal view of when a duty might arise, the
case itself revolved around an alleged breach of the duty to initiate
civil commitment proceedings against the patient, not a duty to warn
possible victims.' " Peterson v. State127 also involved judicial recogni-
tion of a cause of action despite the lack of an identifiable victim,
but extended commitment, not warnings, was the essence of the
allegation. 2 8
In Leedy v. Hartnett2 9 the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, in obiter dicta, suggested that in
Pennsylvania a duty to warn identifiable victims exists, although the
court found no duty on the facts of the case. 30 Having left a Veter-
ans Administration Hospital shortly before, the plaintiff assaulted a
couple with whom he was staying; the incident occurred on a night
when they had been out together drinking. V.A. hospital personnel
knew that the patient had a tendency toward violence when he was
drinking and knew his intended abode after he left the hospital. The
court stated, "Assuming that Pennsylvania would adopt a theory of
liability similar to Tarasoff, the Court is of the view that Pennsylva-
nia would not extend that theory to cover the facts of this case."''
The court considered that Hartnett did not pose a danger to the
121. 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980).
122. Id. at 753, 614 P.2d at 734, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
123. Id. at 752-58, 614 P.2d at 734-38, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 76-80. Additionally, in Cairl v.
State, 323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982), the court held that no duty existed due to the lack of an
identifiable victim.
124. 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
125. Id. at 194-95.
126. Id. at 187.
127. 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983) (patient diagnosed as having schizophre-
nia was released from a state hospital and shortly thereafter injured another motorist in a
vehicle collision).
128. See id. at 235-36.
129. 510 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Pa. 1981), affd without opinion, 676 F.2d 686 (3d Cir.
1982).
130. Id. at 1130.
131. Id.
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Leedys different from the danger he posed to anyone with whom he
might be in contact with while drinking.'32 The Leedys were not
readily identifiable victims within the compass of the Tarasoff doc-
trine, even though the statistical probability of them becoming vic-
tims increased because they allowed him to live with them and thus
saw more of him than any other persons did. 3
In Hopewell v. Adebimpe,13 4 however, a Pennsylvania county
court held that the confidentiality of the patient-psychotherapist re-
lationship is absolute and relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision in In re B 35 for support. Although the Hopewell case in-
volved a situation analogous to Tarasoff, In re B did not. The latter
concerned a request for the release of medical records of psychiatric
treatment held by a doctor. 136 The records were allegedly pertinent
to the dispositional phase of a juvenile delinquency hearing. In fact,
the court in In re B also asserted that the disclosure of records of
inpatient psychiatric treatment was barred by the subject's constitu-
tionally protected right of privacy under the federal constitution and
the Pennsylvania constitution.' Thus, the status of the Tarasoff
doctrine in Pennsylvania is uncertain at present.1
3 8
The cases in this area, however, with one or two exceptions,
paint a fairly clear and consistent picture on the nationwide canvass.
A therapist who is aware of, or who reasonably ought to be aware of,
the potential dangerousness of one of his patients to a readily identi-
fiable person or persons,' 3 9 owes a duty to protect that third party
from harm by warnings or other reasonable means. Are these cases
analogous to the alleged duty to warn in the AIDS context?
Many factors point to an affirmative answer to that question.
Most important is that the psychotherapist-patient relationship has
traditionally been regarded as a highly confidential one, even more
so than general physician-patient relationships. This higher level of
confidentiality is evidenced by, existing privilege statutes. Many
states have specific statutes governing the relationship of psychother-
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1130-31.
134. 129 Pitt. L.J. 35 (1981).
135. 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419 (1978).
136. Id. at 475, 394 A.2d at 420-21.
137. Id. at 481-86, 394 A.2d at 423-25.
138. This is also the view of Professor Turkington. See Turkington, Legal Protection for
the Confidentiality of Health Care Information in Pennsylvania, 32 VILL. L. REv. 259, 396
(1987).
139. The readily identifiable victim limitation appears to have been widely adopted. See
Brady v. Hopper, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984); Leedy v. Hartnett, 510 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D.
Pa. 1981); Bardoni v. Kim, 151 Mich App. 169, 390 N.W.2d 218 (1986).
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apist and patient that are stricter than the general physician-patient
privilege laws. Pennsylvania exemplifies this position at least as far
as psychologists, as opposed to psychiatrists, are concerned.14
Further, it has never really been denied that in the psychothera-
pist-patient context disclosure of information to third parties might
create a rift in the therapeutic alliance and be damaging to current
or future therapeutic efforts. The majority in Tarasoff accepted this
possibility, but determined that the harm was outweighed by the
danger to the public of nondisclosure. 41 In the court's balancing pro-
cess, the duty to disclose came out on top. It was on this issue that
Justice Clark found himself at odds with the majority and chose to
dissent,142 expressing his opinion that the scale of harms tipped in
the opposite direction.
14 3
The majority in Tarasoff also recognized the inherent difficul-
ties in predicting future dangerousness of patients and the inevitable
substantial degree of predictive inaccuracy."' Nevertheless, the ma-
jority was not deterred from recognizing a duty to warn. A certain
amount of needlessly caused harm and mental anguish to safe third
parties was part of the price to pay for protection of victims who
were not safe and who were likely to suffer serious harm if the pa-
tient's directed hostility was allowed to come to fruition.'45
The unavoidable existence of false positives is also a complica-
tion in the AIDS sphere, as is the fact that many victims may con-
tract the HIV virus but may not in fact develop ARC or AIDS.
Since victims who develop AIDS will almost certainly die, by anal-
ogy with Tarasoff, a duty to warn seems justified. Indeed, predictive
accuracy is greater for AIDS than for dangerousness. The prediction
is based on scientifically observable and verifiable data and, when
confirmatory testing (especially the Western Blot test) has been con-
ducted, the number of false positives can be reduced to a fairly insig-
nificant number. When there is danger to a sexual partner, one may
also observe that, in general, sexual behavior is more prevalent than
violent behavior.
140. See generally Knapp, VandeCreek & Zirkel, Privileged Communications for Psy-
chotherapists in Pennsylvania: A Time for Statutory Reform, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 267 (1987).
141. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 440-42, 551 P.2d 334, 346-47,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 26-27 (1976).
142. Id. at 452, 551 P.2d at 354-55, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 34-35 (Clark, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 452-64, 551 P.2d at 354-62, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 34-42 (Clark, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 437-39, 551 P.2d at 344-46, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24-26.
145. Id. at 440, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26 ("The risk that unnecessary
warnings be given is a reasonable price to pay for the lives of possible victims that may be
saved.").
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Moreover, in many instances, even if a third party is forewarned
of potential violence from a particular individual, he or she may have
few means available to protect against its occurrence. By contrast, a
sexual partner of an HIV carrier has certain simple precautionary
measures available. If an HIV carrier demonstrates an unwillingness
to personally inform a sexual partner of his or her status, there are
few other options other than warning potential victims. In the
Tarasoff context, sometimes civil commitment may be a viable
alternative.
In many situations there will be a readily identifiable victim of a
person who has tested HIV positive-e.g., a sexual partner-and so
the Tarasoff doctrine appears to be applicable. When the patient has
no steady sexual partners, it is unlikely that a duty to warn would
arise."'
There are, however, some distinguishing features between the
AIDS and Tarasoff situations. 1' 7 In the Tarasoff situation the dan-
ger is person-specific and ends once the person has carried out the
threatened act or acts of violence. Violence is not contagious. There
is no unlimited chain of infection as there is for AIDS. Further, it
has never been suggested that disclosure of a person's infectivity
might be therapeutic to that individual, whereas this proposition has
some support in the Tarasoff sphere." 8 It is also impossible to ignore
the mentally disordered state of the individual in the Tarasoff scena-
rio. Although many AIDS patients have neurological dysfunction as-
sociated with the disease, it is by no means certain to result.
As Hermann and Gagliano have said about reliance on conta-
gious disease and Tarasoff precedents in the AIDS/HIV arena, "Ex-
isting case law would have to be extended to impose on a health care
provider a duty of disclosure where a competent, fully informed pa-
tient, who had agreed after competent counselling to make his or her
own disclosure, failed to do so."' 9
146. See, e.g., Gammill v. United States, 727 F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 1984) ("at the
bare minimum the physician must be aware of the specific risks to specific persons before a
duty to warn exists.").
147. It is relatively unimportant that Tarasoff involved potential criminal conduct,
whereas there may be none in the AIDS context.
148. See Wulsin, Bursztajn & Gutheil, Unexpected Clinical Features of the Tarasoff
Decision: The Therapeutic Alliance and the "Duty to Warn", 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 601
(1983), and sources cited therein.
149. Hermann & Gagliano, AIDS, Therapeutic Confidentiality, and Warning Third
Parties, 48 MD. L. REV. 55, 69 (1989) [hereinafter AIDS, Confidentiality]. For an extended
commentary on the Tarasoff and contagious diseases lines of cases, see Comment, The Physi-
cian's Duty to Warn Non-Patients: AIDS Enters the Equation, 5 COOLEY L. REV. 353 (1988).
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V. The States Respond
Reporting statutes do not create any duty to warn third parties,
nor do they provide any permissive authority to so warn. Indeed,
many such statutes have strict confidentiality provisions."' Never-
theless, as some of the contagious diseases cases illustrate, merely
because a physician reported the case to the state authorities, the
imposition of a duty to warn is not precluded. Further, although ex-
tremely difficult issues of causation would have to be overcome, a
successful cause of action might be founded on a failure to report a
disease when a contact developed a preventable disease. 5' The rele-
vant Pennsylvania statutes provide that state and local health au-
thorities may not disclose reports of diseases to outside persons or
agencies without the authority of a court order.'52
A number of states also have general statutory provisions that
create a legal duty to maintain the confidentiality of medical infor-
mation or records. 5 ' Although these statutes often contain excep-
tions to that general duty, there is rarely any mention of disclosures
to persons potentially at risk of infection from the patient. 5 Histori-
cally, courts have created duties at common law that effectively add
exceptions to the general statutory duties, so these statutes may not
significantly influence the outcome of a specific decided case. 155
Early statutes that focused specifically on AIDS often required
the maintenance of strict confidentiality regarding AIDS-related in-
formation and contained no license or duty to warn third parties.
California was the first state to enact provisions relating to the confi-
dentiality of AIDS-related information, and the statute effectively
prohibited the disclosure of any such information without the pa-
150. For example, a Maryland statutory provision requires that reports of HIV test re-
sults by directors of medical laboratories preserve the anonymity of individual test subjects.
See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-207(d) (Supp. 1988).
151. See Derrick v. Ontario Community Hosp., 47 Cal. App. 3d 145, 120 Cal. Rptr. 566
(Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
152. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 521.15 (Purdon 1977).
153. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10 (West Supp. 1987); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
11, § 70E (West Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651 (West Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 10-7-504 (Supp. 1987). See also COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY
LAWS 1984-85 (R. Smith ed. 1984).
154. For example, the California statutory provision contains numerous instances in
which disclosure of medical information regarding a patient is permitted, but makes no refer-
ence to third parties at risk of contracting a disease from the patient. See CAL. CIv. CODE §
56.10 (West Supp. 1987).
155. Despite the California statute that generally preserves the confidentiality of medi-
cal information, the California courts nevertheless developed the Tarasoff doctrine regarding
dangerous mental patients.
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tient's consent." 6 In 1985, Florida enacted a statute making it a
criminal offense to disclose a serologic test result to anyone other
than the patient without the written consent of the patient. 5 ' This
provision, however, was repealed on July 6, 1988. The new Florida
statute provides a more comprehensive list of persons or agencies to
whom test results may be disclosed, but contains no authority or
duty for physicians to disclose to third parties at risk.158 Indeed, the
statute emphasizes the need for voluntary and confidential testing
and states that at present many are deterred from testing because
they fear unauthorized disclosures.
59
In 1986, Massachusetts enacted a very strict statute that pro-
vides that no health care facility or physician may disclose the re-
sults of an HIV test to any person other than the subject thereof
without the subject's express written authorization.'"0 Currently,
however, the Massachusetts legislature is debating a measure that
would permit physicians to warn third parties about their sexual
partners' HIV antibody status.'
More recently, Hawaii enacted a statute that provides for the
strict confidentiality of records that indicate a person has HIV infec-
tion, ARC, or AIDS. The statute applies to records held by numer-
ous groups, including state agencies and physicians, and contains no
provision permitting disclosure to third parties who are at risk of
infection.1
6 2
In 1988, Vermont's legislature passed a statute that prohibits
the disclosure of any individually-identifiable, HIV-related testing or
counselling information without a court order. 6 ' Kansas enacted a
fairly strict confidentiality statute in the same year that requires the
test subject's written consent prior to disclosure except in very nar-
156. 1985 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. § 199.21 (Deering).
157. The statutory exceptions permitted communication of test results between certain
health care providers or disclosure of the results during medical or epidemiological research
without revelation of the individual's name or identifying characteristics. FLA. STAT. ANN. 14A
§ 381.606 (West 1986) (repealed 1988).
158. FLA. STAT. ANN. 14A § 381.609(2)(f) (West Supp. 1989).
159. Id. The chapter on Sexually Transmittable Diseases, however, grants the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services authority to conduct contact tracing for the pur-
pose of investigating the source and spread of the AIDS virus and ordering persons to submit
to examination and treatment as necessary. See FLA. STAT. ANN. 14A § 384.26 (West Supp.
1989).
160. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 70F (Supp. 1989).
161. H.R. 5554 (Mass. 1988). The bill would permit health care practitioners to enlist
the help of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health in the task of warning third
parties.
162. HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-101 (Supp. 1988).
163. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1705 (Supp. 1988).
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rowly defined circumstances, such as disclosure to other health care
providers who will be placed in contact with the bodily fluids of the
infected patient.""
In the last year or so, state legislative initiatives addressing the
issue of confidentiality generally demonstrate a clear trend toward
favoring broader powers of disclosure, and specifically permit dis-
closure to contacts of the test subject. As one might expect, these
laws also tend to be more elaborate and sophisticated, reflecting the
extended experience of coping with the epidemic and increased
knowledge and understanding of the disease and its implications.165
One might say that some sort of consensus is developing, at least as
far as physician disclosure to third parties is concerned. These laws
generally permit disclosure to contacts of the patient but do not
mandate such disclosure. They also provide immunity to physicians
against the consequences of either disclosure or non-disclosure.
A Texas statute declares that an HIV test result is confidential,
but further provides for the release of such information by a person
who has such information, including physicians and hospitals, to cer-
tain specified agencies or persons. 66 Disclosure to the spouse of the
infected person is permitted if made by the physician who ordered
the test.1 67 The physician, however, may not be subject to a cause of
action for failure to notify, and the statute creates no duty to dis-
close. 68 The statute does not authorize any disclosure to other con-
tacts of the test subject or others at risk of exposure from him.
Missouri legislation appears to have granted discretion to a phy-
sician to disclose HIV antibody test results to a person's spouse.169 It
has been suggested, however, that the wording of the Missouri stat-
ute may preclude the existence of such authority in any person other
than a public employee (who certainly is granted such statutory au-
thority). 170 The statute provides that there is no duty to disclose cre-
164. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6001 to 6004 (Supp. 1988).
165. Many state laws now require that test subjects be counselled about the implications
of test results at the time that the informed consent of the patient is sought. The Pennsylvania
bill requires pre-test and post-test counselling. See infra notes 300-03 and accompanying text.
Additionally, many laws, including the Pennsylvania bill, now require that HIV test results be
confirmed before they are conveyed to the subject. However, the relevant Maine statute does
not grant authority to physicians to disclose HIV antibody test results to third parties poten-
tially at risk. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19203 (1989).
166. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, § 9.03 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
167. Id. § 9.03(7).
168. Id.
169. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.656.2(1)(d) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
170. See Schultz & Reuter, AIDS Legislation in Missouri: An Analysis and a Propo-
sal, 53 Mo. L. REV. 599 (1988). These writers suggest that there is no statutory remedy for
unauthorized disclosure by a non-public employee. Id. at 611.
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ated by the legislation . 71 Finally, the statute immunizes any person
who notifies a third party in accordance with the provisions and who
does not act in bad faith or conscious disregard. 2
Wisconsin permits the disclosure of the results of a positive HIV
test by the physician to any person who is known by the physician
and with whom the test subject has had sexual contact or has shared
intravenous drug use paraphernalia, provided the test subject is
deceased.1
73
California now permits a physician or surgeon who has the re-
sults of a positive HIV test to disclose the test result to a person
reasonably believed to be the spouse or sexual partner of the test
subject or a person with whom the patient has shared the use of
hypodermic needles.17 No civil or criminal liability may arise from a
disclosure that is permitted but not mandated. 17 5 No identifying in-
formation relating to the test subject may be revealed.
76
Indiana grants discretion to a person to reveal medical or epide-
miological information to a named person for the purpose of protect-
ing the latter's life or health.' In 1988, Georgia granted statutory
discretion to physicians to warn a spouse, sexual partner, or child of
the patient, spouse, or sexual partner when the physician reasonably
believes such an individual to be at risk of infection with HIV from
that patient. 78 The statute specifically provides that a physician will
incur no civil or criminal liability arising from disclosure of informa-
tion to such a third party or from a failure to disclose.'7 A South
Carolina statute, categorizing HIV infection and AIDS as sexually
transmitted diseases, similarly provides physicians with immunity
from actions in damages arising out of any disclosure to a spouse or
known contact of a person with HIV infection or AIDS.'
Three recent statutes seem to confirm this trend of providing a
permissive framework to physicians with respect to disclosures to
third parties at risk of infection. New York has enacted a statute
that begins with a statement that no person may be compelled to
disclose, nor may he disclose, confidential, HIV-related information,
171. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.656.2(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
172. Id. § 191.656.2(1).
173. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.025(5)(14) (West 1989).
174. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.25(a) (West Supp. 1989).
175. Id. § 199.25(c).
176. Id. § 199.25(a).
177. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-1-9.5-7(a)(3) (Burns Supp. 1989).
178. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-723(g) (Harrison Supp. 1989).
179. Id. § 38-723(j).
180. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-146 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
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but the statute then proceeds to list numerous exceptions to that gen-
eral principle. The statute declares that a physician may disclose
confidential HIV-related information under certain conditions. First,
disclosure must be to a contact' 81 whom the physician reasonably
believes is at a significant risk of infection and the physician must
reasonably believe that disclosure is medically appropriate.,8" Sec-
ond, the physician is required to have counselled the protected indi-
vidual regarding the necessity of notifying the contact and the phy-
isican must reasonably believe that the patient will not inform the
contact himself.'83 Third, the physician must have warned the pro-
tected individual of his or her intent to disclose and must have of-
fered the individual the option of having the disclosure made by a
public health officer. "' The identity of the protected individual must
not be revealed at the disclosure.' 8 5 Finally, the statute provides that
no legal liability may arise from any failure to notify a contact or
from any disclosure to a contact made in accordance with the provi-
sions of the statute in good faith.' 86
Rhode Island enacted a similar statute that became effective in
January 1989. Pursuant to the statute, a physician is permitted to
notify any person in close and continuous contact with an AIDS-
infected patient when there is a clear and present danger of conta-
gion, and when the physician has reason to believe that the patient
will not warn the third party.' 87
Connecticut is the latest state to enact confidentiality provisions
pertaining to AIDS and the HIV virus. The relevant statute also per-
mits a physician to notify partners of the infected person at the phy-
sician's discretion,' 88 but creates no duty to warn.
These recent statutes only permit warnings to be given when the
physician has a reasonable belief that the infected person will not
notify the contact of his status, of any prior exposure, and of the
continuing risk of infection. In many instances the physician will find
it difficult or even impossible to form such a belief based on the ac-
tual response of the infected individual. Verification of the patient's
181. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782(4)(a) (Consol. Supp. 1989). Contact is defined as
an identified spouse or sex partner of the protected individual or a person identified as having
shared hypodermic needles or syringes with the protected individual. Id. § 2780.
182. Id. § 2782(4)(a).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. § 2782(4)(b).
186. 1988 N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2783(3) (Consol. Supp. 1989).
187. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-6-17(b)(v) (Supp. 1988).
188. Substitute Senate Bill No. 812, Public Act No. 89-246 (1989), section 4(b).
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disclosure or non-disclosure is ruled out. Thus, apart from instances
of outright refusal, a physician may be groping in the dark. He may
consider that no IV drug user will disclose such information to per-
sons with whom he shares paraphernalia for drug use, yet presuma-
bly, in the absence of at least some hesitation emanating from the
patient about warning contacts, the physician will lack the necessary
reasonable belief.
The statutes clearly contemplate an individualized assessment,
and attempt to avoid duplicated and unnecessary warnings. Thus, it
is likely that a number of contacts will not be warned despite ap-
pearances. Only a policy of accepted overkill and duplicated warn-
ings will avoid this scenario. This Article will assume for the time
being that those contacts who are warned will modify their behavior
to reduce the risk of infection.'89
The California legislative provision is noteworthy insofar as it
appears to contemplate such duplication. 190 The statute grants unfet-
tered discretion to a physician to notify contacts provided he has first
discussed the test results with the patient and has offered the patient
appropriate educational and psychological counselling,191 and has at-
tempted to obtain the patient's voluntary consent to notification.'9"
No disclosure may occur without the patient being told in advance
that such disclosure will take place. 9 ' Thus, disclosure by a physi-
cian may take place even though the patient will notify the contact.
It is unreasonable to expect physicians to conduct any kind of
detailed inquiry or investigation into a person's contacts,9 , and stub-
born, uncooperative patients will likely reveal little even if such in-
vestigation took place. At best, only the most obvious contacts would
be notified, not necessarily those at risk or most at risk. Physicians
would probably be reluctant to initiate any investigation for fear of
discovering persons at risk, since such discoveries might thereby ex-
189. In fact, this should not be so critically assumed, and will be dealt with later in this
Article. See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
190. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.25(a) (West Supp. 1989) (the physician
does not have to hold a reasonable belief that the patient will not inform his or her contacts
personally).
191. This counselling shall include information on the risks of transmitting HIV to
others and methods of avoiding those risks. Id. § 199.25.
192. Id. § 199.25(b).
193. Id.
194. Even Tarasoff does not require therapists to go so far. While declining to adopt any
hard and fast rule, the court in Tarasoff recognized that in many cases it would be unreasona-
ble to carry out an investigation to discover a potential victim's identity and seemed to require
only a "moment's reflection" to discover such an identity. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
17 Cal. 3d 425, 439 n.ll, 551 P.2d 334, 345 n.ll, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 25 n.ll (1976).
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pose the physicians to liability for failure to warn.19
Despite outward appearances, state statutes that address the
confidentiality issue regarding AIDS and/or HIV infection unfortu-
nately may not remove all doubts about legal liability for disclosures
or failures to disclose. The common law may still play a part, and
duties or powers to warn may retain independent life in some juris-
dictions. In certain states the relevant statute is laudably clear. In
accordance with the statute, no liability can arise from either non-
disclosure or disclosure to contacts generally. Georgia is one state
with such a provision. 196 It is difficult to envision a common law duty
or power to warn surviving such a legislative enactment.
Other state statutes are less clear. It appears that the South
Carolina statute, for instance, merely provides exemption from legal
liability for such disclosures. 9 ' No immunity is provided for failures
to warn, and although the statute is permissive in nature, a duty to
warn cannot be completely ruled out. Statutes, such as in Massachu-
setts, 198 which do not permit disclosures to contacts and mandate
strict confidentiality of test results, may provide sufficient evidence of
a legislative intent to defeat a common law duty or power to warn,
but one cannot assume this to be so.' Finally, those statutes that
are explicit in permitting disclosure only to a certain limited class of
contacts, such as spouses as in the Texas statute, 00 might allow a
court some leeway to tack on a power to notify other contacts despite
the seeming clarity of legislative expression.
VI. Contact Tracing
Running in tandem with the trend of providing powers to physi-
cians to warn third parties at risk from the patient, is the trend of
granting discretion to public health agencies to warn such persons.
In some instances, the relevant state statute grants authority to no-
tify contacts to either physicians or public health officials.2' The
195. This is also the view of Hermann and Gagliano. See AIDS, Confidentiality, supra
note 149, at 71-72.
196. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-723(j) (Harrison Supp. 1988).
197. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-146 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988). For a list of exemptions
from disclosure, see R.I. GEN LAWS. § 23-6-17 (Supp. 1988).
198. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 11, § 70F (Supp. 1987).
199. Some argue that this is unlikely unless the statute explicitly rejected any such im-
plied limitation. See Dickens, Legal Limits of AIDS Confidentiality, 259 J. A.M.A. 3449
(1988). See also Hirsh, AIDS and the Law: A Summary and Conclusion, 10 J. LEG. MED.
169, 180-81 (1989).
200. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4419(b)-I, § 9.03(b)(7) (Supp. 1989) (no duty to
warn arises since no cause of action can emanate from a failure to notify).
201. The latest state statute to be passed, in Connecticut, reflects this trend, see Substi-
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California statute provides that either a physician, a surgeon, or the
county health officer may notify contacts about their exposure, pro-
viding the informer does not reveal identifying information about the
patient.20 2 The statute is permissive with respect to both parties.03
The Georgia statute similarly grants discretion to both physi-
cians and the Department of Human Resources or county board of
health to notify contacts.20 4 Once more, the statute is generally per-
missive with regard to both parties, except that the public health
authorities must contact and provide counselling to the spouse of any
HIV infected person, if both persons are reasonably likely to have
engaged in sexual intercourse or other conduct likely to transmit the
virus.203 The spouse, however, must be locatable and contactable
without undue difficulty, and the dangerous conduct must have oc-
curred within the past seven years.206 South Carolina appears to
grant similar discretion to both physicians and state agencies. 07
Other state statutes seem to grant discretion to notify contacts
solely to physicians. The Rhode Island 208 and Wisconsin20 9 legisla-
tive enactments are exclusive to physicians, although in the latter,
contacts may only be notified when the infected individual has al-
ready died. New York's statute is unique insofar as it actually gives
a choice to the test subject whether he wants his physician or the
public health authorities to notify a contact.210
Some statutes, however, appear to grant sole discretion to public
health authorities to notify contacts. The pertinent Idaho legislation
grants authority to contact and advise those believed to have been
exposed to the HIV virus only to state or local health authorities.211
Similarly, Washington's statute appears to grant authority to notify
contacts only to state and local public health officers.21 2 Florida also
follows this legislative trend.2"3
tute Senate Bill No. 812, Public Act No. 89-246, section 4.
202. Special restrictions, however, apply to physicians and surgeons. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 199.25(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1989).
203. Id. § 199.25(c), (d).
204. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-7 23(g), (h)(3)(B) (Harrison Supp. 1988).
205. Id. § 38-723(h)(3)(c).
206. Id.
207. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-135, 146 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
208. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-6-17(b) (Supp. 1988).
209. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 146.025(5)(14) (West 1989).
210. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW, § 2782(4)(a)(4) (Consol. Supp. 1989).
211. IDAHO CODE § 39-610(2) (Supp. 1988).
212. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.022 (West Supp. 1989). Pursuant to this statute,
AIDS and HIV infection are handled under the general framework of sexually transmitted
diseases.
213. FLA. STAT. ANN. 29 §§ 381.609, 384.26 (West Supp. 1989). See also IOWA CODE
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The New Hampshire statute grants discretion to the director of
the division of public health services or his designee to do contact
referrals, but no authority is granted to other individuals or agen-
cies.21 The relevant Colorado statutory provisions provide that it is
the duty of state and local health officers to investigate sources of
HIV infection and to use every proper means to prevent the spread
of the disease. 15 It appears to be an offense for a physician, rather
than public health officials, to notify contacts without the patient's
consent.2 16
In general, authority is given to public health officials to contact
a wider class of individuals than is granted to physicians. In Georgia,
physicians may notify the patient's spouse, sexual partner, or the off-
spring of such persons, whereas the public health authorities may
contact any person believed to be at risk of infection from HIV.2" 7 In
those states that grant discretion to public health officials alone, the
state statute is usually broadly phrased and not limited to particular
classes of persons. In Idaho, public health officials may contact any-
one believed to have been exposed to HIV.218 In New Hampshire,
public health officials may contact anyone who may have been in-
fected with HIV.21 9
Contact tracing-sometimes termed partner notification, con-
tact epidemiology, or case-finding-has been a major prevention
strategy within the context of sexually transmitted disease220 limita-
tion programs for quite a number of years.22" ' Contact tracing of a
venereal disease patient's sexual contacts by public health officials
first began in the 1930s. 22 Public health officials would inform con-
tacted individuals of their chance of having become infected, would
test these persons, and if necessary, would treat them.22 In the con-
ANN. § 141.6-.24 (West 1989).
214. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-F:9 (Supp. 1988).
215. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-1405(1) (Supp. 1988).
216. See Richards, Communicable Disease Control in Colorado: A Rational Approach
to AIDS, 65 DEN. U.L. REV. 127, 137 (1988) [hereinafter Rational Approach].
217. GA. CODE ANN. §,38-723(g), (h)(3)(B) (Harrison Supp. 1988).
218. IDAHO CODE § 39-610(2) (Supp. 1988).
219. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-F:9 (Supp. 1988).
220. Although the HIV virus is a blood borne disease rather than strictly a sexually
transmitted disease (STD), because the major mode of transmission of the virus is through
sexual activity, most often anal intercourse, it is often classified as a sexually transmitted dis-
ease. In fact, many states apply statutory provisions that deal with STDs to AIDS or HIV
infection.
221. See Rothenberg & Potterat, Strategies for Management of Sex Partners, in SEXU-
ALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 965, 965-72 (Holmes, Mardh, Sparling & Weisner eds. 1984).
222. See No MAGIc BULLET, supra note 69, at 150-51.
223. Id. at 150.
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text of venereal diseases, this strategy remained popular until effec-
tive cures for the diseases were developed, after which a good deal of
the urgency of the situation was lost."" Despite this, the efficacy and
success of contact tracing has not yet been determined accurately.
Contact tracing or partner notification 2 5 generally requires the
cooperation of the patient, and often members of a high-risk group
as a whole. This is not essential, however, in cases when a patient is
known to be married and notification is to be made only to the
spouse. Normally though, voluntary disclosure is a prerequisite to a
successful contact-tracing program. Moreover, many programs rely
in the first instance on self-notification of contacts by the patient.
Even Colorado's program relies on such notification. 26 Direct con-
tact by public health officials is usually viewed as a last resort, with
such officials merely providing assistance to the patient to further his
own efforts. In some cases, however, contact tracing can amount to
public health officials aggressively seeking out information concern-
ing contacts by performing investigative work such as interviews. 27
Public health officials lack powers to compel a person to reveal
contacts. The fact that the person's partners are probably engaged in
criminal or at least arguably immoral conduct, will often be a power-
ful disincentive to a revelation of their identities, even under a volun-
tary scheme. Thus, only voluntary and not mandatory contact trac-
ing is feasible or desirable. Indeed, forty-eight states, Puerto Rico,
the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia offer provider refer-
ral upon request by clients.2 In such cases, infected patients ask for
224. Id. at 177.
225. The terms "partner notification" and "contact tracing" are used synonymously his-
torically and in this Article. Today, however, many people use contact tracing to describe not
only the notification process, but also the preceding investigation for potential contacts. See
AIDS, supra note 58, at 46. For contact tracing, see generally Levine, Contract Tracing for
HIV Infection: A Plea for Privacy, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 157 (1988).
226. For a discussion of the Minnesota and Colorado programs, see Comment, AIDS:
Balancing the Physician's Duty to Warn and Confidentiality Concerns, 38 EMORY L.J. 279,
302-05 (1989) [hereinafter Balancing the Physician's Duty].
227. This is usually termed active as opposed to voluntary contact tracing. See Rothen-
berg, The Aids Project: Creating a Public Health Policy-Rights and Obligations of Health
Care Workers, 48 MD. L. REV. 93, 181-82 (1989) [hereinafter Public Health Policy]. The
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), National Association of
County Health Officials (NACHO), and the U.S. Conference of Local Health Officers (US-
CHLO) all support a privilege to disclose for health care providers and health departments to
notify contacts, but reject the practice of actively seeking out the identities of partners. The
provider would have to learn of at-risk partners through the provider's ordinary activities. See
ASTHO, NACHO & USCLHO, Guide to Public Health Practice: HIV Partner Notification
Strategies 1, 14 (1988) [hereinafter Guide].
228. Partner Notification for Preventing Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infec-
tion - Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, Virginia, 37 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 393, 394-95 (1988) (Table I) [hereinafter Partner Notification].
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the assistance of public health officials to notify contacts and counsel
them. 29
To date, contact tracing has been used only sparingly in the
context of AIDS. Recent statutes suggest that it will play a more
prominent role in the future as part of the educative effort to combat
the spread of the disease. In the past, contact tracing in AIDS or
HIV cases had been viewed as inappropriate, probably because of
the lack of a cure. Other sexually transmitted diseases are curable.
Yet ironically, as we have seen, contact tracing in cases of venereal
disease stopped in large measure as soon as a cure appeared.3 0 Con-
tact tracing is a potentially rich source of information about the de-
mographic patterns of persons at risk for HIV infection in a particu-
lar community, as well as a tool for prevention of the spread of the
disease. There is some empirical data available suggesting that con-
tacting can allow for a targeted educational effort, leading to behav-
ior modifications resulting in risk minimization, as well as being a
fairly cost-effective use of public health resources.2"' Colorado prob-
ably has the most interventionist public health policy on HIV infec-
tion in the nation. Public health officials in Colorado have been con-
ducting contact tracing for some time now, and officials in the state
are enthusiastic about the results.232 In 1988, it was reported that
the Colorado Department of Health had contacted and counselled
500 of 618 named partners of 353 HIV positive individuals. Three
hundred and eighty contacts were tested and forty-eight of them
were also HIV positive.2 3
In most instances contact tracing by state public health authori-
ties is legally permitted, but is not mandatory. Even in New Hamp-
shire, where follow-up activities are obligatory,234 contact referral is
229. Id. ASTHO, NACHO, and USCLHO recommend that health department officials
and health care providers utilize both patient and provider referral strategies and consider that
a privilege to disclose to partners ought to exist, even in the absence of the patient's coopera-
tion. See Guide, supra note 227, at 5, 14.
230. See No MAGIC BULLET, supra note 69, at 177.
231. See Wykoff, Heath, Hollis, Leonard, Quiller, Jones, Artzrouni & Parker, Contact
Tracing to Identify Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in a Rural Community, 259 J.
A.M.A. 3563 (1988) [hereinafter Contact Tracing]. This was a South Carolina study/program
that identified 83 sex contacts. The cost per HIV positive individual identified was approxi-
mately $810. Eight of the 83 individuals were found to be HIV antibody positive. Observations
indicated that the mean number of sexual contacts and the use of condoms changed following
counselling.
232. See Balancing the Physician's Duty, supra note 226, at 305.
233. See Letter to the Editor from Thomas M. Vernon, M.D. & Richard E. Hoffman,
M.D., Contact Tracing to Control the Spread of HIV, 260 J. A.M.A. 3274-75 (1988).
234. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141F:9 (Supp. 1988).
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optional to a degree.235 The statute provides that the director of pub-
lic health services shall do contact referral "if possible," without
stating what factors are relevant to feasibility.286 Although in Geor-
gia contact tracing is generally discretionary, it is mandatory in situ-
ations involving a spouse when health officials suspect recent conduct
that is likely to spread the HIV virus.31 7 In Idaho, Colorado, and
South Carolina disclosure is entirely optional, 38 whereas in Wash-
ington the converse is the case-state and local public health officials
are obliged to investigate identified partners.239 The position in Mis-
souri is particularly interesting. The Missouri Department of Health
has had a contact tracing policy for some time,24 0 but the new legis-
lation in Missouri requires anonymous test sites to initiate programs
of partner notification for those who test HIV positive.241
Some statutes provide specific authority for public health offi-
cials to interview persons who have HIV infection for the purpose of
identifying contacts and potential sources of infection.242 This may
be for the purposes of active contact tracing (i.e., tracing all contacts
of infected individuals), or limited contact tracing (i.e., soliciting de-
tails of contacts within certain at risk populations). At present, no
state requires physicians or laboratories to report the names of per-
sons who have been disclosed as contacts of the test subject. A Cali-
fornia proposal that would have required the reporting of persons
suspected of being infected with the virus, and persons actually in-
fected, as well as imposing a duty on local health authorities to no-
tify contacts of reported individuals, was defeated by voters in the
state at the end of 1988.243
Beside the disclosure of the individual's HIV status to his con-
tacts, which itself amounts to a breach of the patient's confidences, it
235. Id. The law provides that state authorities are to encourage self-notification by the
patient. Id.
236. Id. § 141F:9.
237. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-723(h)(3)(C) (Harrison Supp. 1988). The statute provides
that the contact shall be made as long as the spouse can be located and contacted without
undue difficulty. Id.
238. Partner Notification, supra note 228, at 394-95 (Table I).
239. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.022 (West Supp. 1989).
240. See Chaski, The Missouri AIDS Law: A Public Health Perspective, 53 Mo. L.
REV. 645, 654-55 (1988).
241. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.686 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
242. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.022 (West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 38-723(h)(A) (Harrison Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. 29 § 384.26 (West Supp. 1989); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 111 /, 7405 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1988).
243. 1988 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. vol. 3, 2844, Proposition 102 (Deering). See also
Schram, AIDS Initiative, Likely to Reappear, Isn't the Answer, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 21,
1989, at 37 [hereinafter AIDS Initiative].
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is much more difficult to contain the spread of such information af-
ter contact tracing, even when a state has a statutory requirement
that all information collected in the course of contact investigation
shall be treated as strictly confidential.2" ' Accepting the view that
public health departments' records on breaches of confidentiality are
generally good, 2" it will still be impossible to prevent a contact from
revealing information about the test subject's HIV status to others.
Statutory requirements that no identifying information about the
test subject be revealed to contacts24 6 in most cases will not prevent
that person's identity from being obvious. All such disclosures are
likely to have a deterrent impact on asymptomatic persons who were
considering undergoing an antibody test. The dangers of discrimina-
tion against such persons after disclosures are great, particularly for
those in high risk groups that are already subject to other forms of
discrimination.
Although results of pilot programs in Colorado, South Carolina,
and other jurisdictions are encouraging, as yet there is no clear evi-
dence as to whether the practice actually results in a decreased inci-
dence of the disease, which is, after all, the main objective.247 Fur-
thermore, there is some evidence that in Colorado voluntary HIV
testing at clinics for gay men has decreased.24 8 In Missouri, the evi-
dence concerning the effect of contact tracing on the voluntary test-
ing program is equivocal. At one point, the numbers presenting for
testing increased, but evidence indicates that lately members of high
risk groups have been deterred from presenting for voluntary
testing.24'
Contact tracing may be expected to have only a limited impact
on the transmission of HIV within the United States for a number of
reasons. First, since few HIV-infected individuals have been diag-
nosed, especially at the asymptomatic stage, it is likely that only a
small minority of HIV-infected individuals will be reached by such
programs.250 Second, the period of asymptomatic HIV infectivity is
244, See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.022(3) (West Supp. 1989). See gener-
ally Wein, Duty to Warn, 261 J. A.M.A. 1355, 1360 (1989).
245. This appears to be so. See Contact Tracing, supra note 231 at 3566.
246. See, eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.25(e) (West Supp. 1989).
247. Letter in Reply to Letter to Editor, Contact Tracing to Control the Spread of HIV,
260 J. A.M.A. 3275 (1988).
248. Byron, The Hidden Risks of Antibody Screening: This is Not Only a Test, Village
Voice, May 27, 1986, at 29-30.
249. See MISSOURI DEP'T OF HEALTH, AIDS IN MISSOURI, Mar. 1988, at 1; AIDS Vic-
tims Shun Missouri's Name Requirement for Testing, Kan. City Star, June 19, 1988, at I A,
col. 1.
250. See Rutherford & Woo, Contact Tracing and the Control of Human Immu-
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potentially extremely long for a contagious disease. A recent study
found that twenty-seven of thirty-one individuals carrying the HIV
virus did not produce antibodies for up to three years after the virus
was detected.251 During this period, data on the location of contacts
will quickly become dated and irrelevant, especially in highly mobile
populations such as homosexual men and IV drug users in urban
areas.2 5' Third, if an extensive program was envisaged, the cost
would be prohibitive in some settings, particularly high risk popula-
tions in cities such as San Francisco, Washington, D.C., and New
York.258
Because of a similar epidemiological pattern, contact tracing for
patients with hepatitis B proved to be difficult.25 ' That disease also
has a prolonged period of infectivity, attracts substantial numbers of
anonymous sex contacts among homosexual males, and has an IV
drug user population that is extremely inaccessible. 55
Difficulties and the cost of locating contacts within high risk
groups, as well as the loss of confidence within populations that har-
bor the highest rates of infection, suggest that mandatory contact
tracing is not a desirable practice when applied universally or
targeted at high risk groups. The real dangers of discrimination
against infected persons within such groups will likely lead to a dras-
tic reduction in the numbers of those groups presenting for voluntary
testing. Some physicians and commentators already believe that the
simple and universal obligation to report cases of the disease to pub-
lic health agencies results in a reduction of persons seeking voluntary
testing.25 There is empirical data suggesting that if testing was to-
tally anonymous (so that reports carrying individual identifying in-
formation were precluded), many more homosexual men would un-
nodeficiency Virus Infection, 259 J. A.M.A. 3609-10 (1988) [hereinafter HIV Infection].
251. See Silent Aids, Time, June 12, 1989, at 61; N.Y. Times, June 1, 1989, at Al, col.
1.
252. See HIV Infection, supra note 250, at 3610.
253. Id. The earlier figures, see supra note 231, were culled from a study of a rural
community in South Carolina. The impracticability of a comprehensive contact tracing pro-
gram in New York is remarked upon in Comment, Confidentiality, Warning, and AIDS: A
Proposal to Protect Patients, Third Parties, and Physicians, 4 TOURO L. REV. 301, 314 &
n.88 (1988).
254. See Partner Notification, supra note 228, at 401.
255. Munday, McDonald, Murray-Sykes & Harris, Contact Tracing in Hepatitis B In-
fection, 59 BRIT. J. VENEREAL DISEASE 314, 314-16 (1983).
256. See Reaves, AIDS and the Law: Disease Spawns Legal Storms, A.B.A. J. Aug.
1983, at 1014. There is also a degree of underreporting. It was found that the number of
reports of AIDS from one New York hospital should have been 40% higher. AM. MED. NEWS,
June 23, 1989, at 3. Nevertheless, the percentage of reported AIDS cases is very high, much
higher than has historically been the case with other contagious disease cases.
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dergo voluntary testing. 5 " It is reasonable to assume that this is so
because such groups do not trust personal and medical information
to remain confidential in the hands of public health officials. While
few unofficial leaks of such information occur, it may be that contact
tracing is the deterrent factor. One would expect that contact tracing
would have its biggest "turn-off effect" on the high risk populations.
Unlike members of high risk groups, some people may not sus-
pect the imminent danger of infection that exists in their case. If
contact tracing is to be practiced on a mandatory basis, it probably
ought to be confined to spouses and female sexual partners of homo-
sexual or bisexual men or of IV drug users. In those situations, coun-
selling and educational efforts may yield improved risk-reducing be-
havior modifications and more cost-effective outcomes. In order to
dispel doubts, a statutory scheme should carefully limit the possible
contacts traceable by public health officials.
Current statutory schemes are very broad and give maximum
discretion to public health officials. Although states conducting con-
tact tracing tend to establish a priority list that probably will include
heterosexual partners of bisexual men, and women who are of
childbearing age, this does not foreclose (except perhaps on the
grounds of insufficient resources) the possibility of contacting mem-
bers of high risk groups.
The Presidential Commission on the HIV Epidemic noted that
unsuspecting persons at risk of exposure to the virus have a right to
be informed of the risk, but supported contact tracing of sex partners
and other IV drug users.25 This approach easily could be counter-
productive if aggressive, coercive, or overly enthusiastic methods are
used to extract information about contacts, and notification occurs
even in the absence of the patient's consent. Contact tracing is an
essential weapon in the fight against AIDS, but ought not to be a
coercive one. Voluntary notification, by the subject or with his con-
sent, should be the invariable rule.
VII. Reporting HIV Infection
The reporting of communicable diseases to public health agen-
cies is now a well-established practice. Such reporting is a prerequi-
site to obtaining knowledge about the prevalence and epidemiology
257. Letter to the Editor from Susan M. Kegeles, Ph.D., Thomas J. Coates, Ph.D., Ber-
nard Lo, M.D. & Joseph A. Catania, Ph.D., Mandatory Reporting of HIV Testing Would
Deter Men From Being Tested, 261 J. A.M.A. 1275-76 (1989) [hereinafter Mandatory Re-
porting]. See also infra note 331.
258. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 75-76.
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of a disease and to any successful contact tracing program. It is,
therefore, essential to overcome physician reluctance to report cases
of the relevant disease. Venereal diseases were vastly underreported
in the early part of the century.25
All states require the reporting of cases of CDC-defined
AIDS260 to public health agencies, usually the state department of
public health. The CDC requires states report such cases to the Cen-
ters. Very few states require the reporting of cases of ARC, mainly
because it is a difficult illness to define.261 A very large minority of
states now require the reporting of cases of HIV infection.2 62 Colo-
rado was the first state to require reporting of confirmed HIV infec-
tion. In addition, many jurisdictions, including cities as well as
states, accept voluntary reports of HIV seropositivity.26 3
In those jurisdictions that have an ongoing contact tracing pro-
gram, the issue of reporting of HIV test results is a vital one. The
majority of persons who are infectious will not have developed full
blown AIDS. It may be many years before they do so, if they do so
at all. Thus, in those states that do not require the reporting of HIV
test results, the biggest source of potential infection remains undis-
closed to public health sources. As a result, a distorted picture of
prevalence rates and epidemiology of the disease may emerge, and a
preventive program such as contact tracing may be frustrated since
there is no access to the highest risk group (i.e., the asymptomatic
HIV-infected patient). The Report of the Pennsylvania Bar Associa-
tion Task Force on AIDS recognized that asymptomatic individuals
are the major source of transmission of HIV. 264 Apart from the esti-
mated size of the respective groups, patients with full blown AIDS
are often highly debilitated and unable to have sexual relations and
engage in other high risk conduct. This is not the case with asymp-
tomatic patients who may live apparently normal lives.
Even when positive HIV test results are universally reported,
however, it is likely that public health authorities will still acquire a
259. No MAGIC BULLET, supra note 69, at 183.
260. Dickens, Legal Limits of AIDS Confidentiality, 259 J. A.M.A. 3449 (1988). Penn-
sylvania's duty to report AIDS cases is found at 28 PA. CODE §§ 27.21, 27.32 (1982).
261. See Public Health Policy, supra note 227, at 178.
262. These states include: Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Gostin,
supra note 77, at 1626. Some states, such as Minnesota, do so only implicitly.
263. See Grad, Communicable Disease and Mental Health: Restrictions of the Person,
12 AM. J.L. & MED. 381, 392-93 n.74 (1986).
264. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 2. The Task Force, unlike the Presidential Commis-
sion, did not recommend the reporting of HIV antibody positive test results. Id. at 19-23.
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distorted perception of the prevalence and epidemiology of the dis-
ease within the jurisdiction. In general, only a small percentage of
asymptomatic persons with HIV infection will be tested. The fact of
such test results being reported may itself reduce the numbers who
present for testing. Public health officials still would not have a com-
plete sample with which to work in their attempt to discover and
investigate actual or potential sources of infection. Nevertheless,
some might still argue that incomplete contact tracing is better than
none.
The thrust of this Article, however, is that until a cure for the
disease is developed, general, mandatory contact tracing programs
should be rejected. A preferable compromise would be to require re-
porting of positive HIV test results, thus allowing a more complete
epidemiological picture of the disease, while omitting personally
identifying characteristics from the report.
Recently it has been suggested that reporting of cases of AIDS
should not contain such information, but should state only the fol-
lowing: (1) the last five digits of the patient's social security number;
(2) demographic information, such as age, sex, race, risk factor, and
home zip code or county of residence; (3) presenting diagnoses and
associated problems; (4) data concerning the isolation and identifica-
tion of infectious agents; and (5) potential treatment and service
needs of the patient.2 65 This opinion applies a fortiori to cases of
HIV infection per se. Anonymous reporting can be expected to in-
crease the numbers of persons requesting HIV testing, thus improv-
ing existing epidemiological data and providing increased access to
infected individuals for counselling to modify behaviors that create
risks to others and to persuade the individual to personally notify
third parties of the risk.166 Such a reporting requirement would serve
many valid public health purposes and would undoubtedly pass con-
stitutional muster because the individual's confidentiality is
protected.6 7
Kentucky currently requires reporting of HIV status only by
code, and Montana only by initials.26 Illinois also does not require
265. See Public Health Policy, supra note 227, at 177-78.
266. See Mandatory Reporting, supra note 257, at 1275-76.
267. The U.S. Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), upheld a state
reporting requirement and stated that it did not implicate a constitutionally protected interest.
The provisions served a legitimate public health purpose and were valid provided disclosure
was limited to public health officials and there were adequate procedures to ensure the confi-
dentiality of the data.
268. Curran, Gostin & Clark, AIDS: Legal and Policy Implications of the Application
of Traditional Disease Control Measures, 15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 27, 29 (1987).
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personal data to be reported. 69 In Colorado, although seropositive
individuals have to be reported by name, the state has declared it
acceptable to submit false names. 70
At present, the reasons for requiring identifying data do not ap-
pear to be compelling in light of the danger of losing many potential
test subjects who will refuse to appear until reporting ceases to be
confidential and becomes anonymous. States should follow Mary-
land's lead regarding the reporting of test results, and require that
the person's identity not be revealed.27'
VIII. A Critique of Partner Notification Policies
The first criticism of current laws that permit or mandate either
physicians or public health officials to notify contacts is that in order
to be effective such programs have to be comprehensive. The lack of
time and resources make this impossible for both groups. Permissive
policies by their nature will fail to achieve universal coverage. These
policies also deny third parties any right to know about the risk to
which they are exposed, which the Presidential Commission on the
HIV Epidemic seemed to endorse. 72
Even when notification does occur, many of those persons al-
ready will have contracted the virus, so the disclosure will have no
preventive element for that person in the absence of a cure. Admit-
tedly, the person may then modify his or her conduct to reduce the
risks to additional future contacts,273 but outside the high risk groups
such contacts are likely to be few, and within the high risk groups
the risk is already well known. It may well be too little, too late. If
and when a cure is developed, the situation will alter as a chain of
transmission may then be interrupted.
In many cases, such notification will also cause some individuals
to suffer lengthy periods of anxiety, sometimes unnecessarily. An in-
269. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. Ill /, para. 7404 (Smith-Hurd 1988).
270. Gostin & Ziegler, A Review of AIDS-Related Legislative and Regulatory Policy
in the United States, 15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 5, 10 (1987). Although the public
health authorities have tolerated this practice, the knowing use of an incorrect name poten-
tially would expose such person to a fine. See Rational Approach, supra note 216, at 156.
271. MD, HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-207(d) (Supp. 1988). In Maryland, the Gover-
nor's Task Force on AIDS recommended against legislation mandating the reporting of HIV-
positive individuals or instituting a policy of contact tracing. See Comment, Doctor-Patient
Confidentiality Versus Duty to Warn in the Context of AIDS Patients and Their Partners, 47
MD. L. REV. 675, 693-94 (1988).
272. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 75-76.
273. It appears, however, that only a minority of women who are HIV positive refrain
from childbearing. Wolfsy, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in Women, 257 J.
A.M.A. 2074-76 (1987).
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dividual who discovers that he or she has been exposed to an infected
person may have to wait many months, or even years, before know-
ing if they have contracted the virus (during the antibody generation
stage) and if they will develop AIDS. There is a well-respected, cur-
rent view suggesting that large numbers of infected persons will go
on to develop only minor non-debilitating symptoms. Additionally,
since the possibility of false test results can not yet be eliminated,
many persons will suffer needless apprehension.
The existence of policies involving notification by either physi-
cians or public health officials is likely to cause a sharp decline in the
number of testees for the virus. The stigma that having the virus can
create is a sufficient deterrent to testing. When no cure exists, there
is often insufficient incentive to test in the first place. Working with
patients and contacts, rather than against their desires, is vital. A
contrary policy is likely to reduce the quantity and accuracy of data
acquired by public health agencies.
It is noteworthy that groups such as homosexual men accepted
the contact tracing policies of departments of health in relation to
venereal diseases, but vigorously reject the proposition in relation to
HIV, probably for good reason. It is vital that such agencies, and
ultimately the CDC, have an accurate picture of the development of
the disease so that the most appropriate strategies can be determined
and implemented. Without test subjects not only will contacts re-
main undiscovered, but opportunities for counselling of infected indi-
viduals will be lost. A decreased number of test subjects will also
mean lost chances to persuade such persons to notify contacts them-
selves or request assistance from an outside agency in this task, and
the frustration of efforts to develop a cure.
Assuming though, for the moment, that partner notification or
contact tracing is a desirable policy, whose function is it, the physi-
cian's or the public health authority's? As noted earlier, in New
York a patient may choose between them. Placing the primary obli-
gation upon physicians would spread the burden broadly and relieve
pressure from already underfunded public health departments. Addi-
tionally, physicians are familiar with handling family situations in-
volving medical issues, and in some cases may be viewed as friends
of the family. This may facilitate the task of notification in some
instances.27
274. It is noteworthy that the very recent Connecticut statute only permits notification
by physicians when both the contact and the protected individual are under the physician's
care. See Substitute Senate Bill No. 812, Public Act No. 89-246, section 4(b).
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Nevertheless, physicians generally have limited time and re-
sources available to them for the task. They will also have little
chance to develop a particularized expertise in the matter, especially
regarding counselling, due to the infrequency with which they will
likely come across such cases. Troyen Brennan has recently sug-
gested that physicians should undertake the task until the efficacy of
contact tracing by public health officials can be assessed. 75 In real-
ity, however, these two forms of notification are complementary to
each other, rather than being substitutes.
At present, the major medical institutions seem confused about
which party should take the main responsibility for such notification;
some seem to be playing "pass the buck." This confusion in roles will
prove deleterious to a general strategy to combat AIDS. It is not
surprising that to some extent individual physicians are a little be-
mused about their role. Traditionally physicians have not played a
direct part in the contact tracing effort with respect to venereal dis-
eases, and legal liability for failure to warn third parties (i.e.,
Tarasoff liability) is of recent vintage. Liability in the earlier conta-
gious disease cases was often of a distinctly different nature. Public
health officials are, by contrast, well versed in the arts of contact
tracing and should view it as essentially their task if the policy itself
is endorsed within the relevant jurisdiction.
In 1987, the Board of Trustees of the American Medical Asso-
ciation (AMA) endorsed a recommendation which states generally
that unsuspecting sexual partners of HIV infected persons should be
warned of the risk to which they are, or have been, exposed.276 The
AMA stated, however, that when a physician has informed the pub-
lic health authorities of an unsuspecting partner of an infected indi-
vidual, the duty to warn should reside with the infected individual
and the public health authorities, not the physician. 2 " The recom-
mendation encouraged states to make the reporting of positive HIV
antibody test results mandatory. 78 The AMA House of Delegates
adopted the report of the Board of Trustees, including those aspects
275. See Brennan, AIDS and the Limits of Confidentiality, 4 J. GEN. INT. MED. 242,
245 (1989).
276. Prevention and Control of Acquired lummunodeficiency Syndrome: An Interim
Report, 258 J. A.M.A. 2097, 2103 (1987) (Recommendations 15, 16) [hereinafter Report].
277. Id. at 2103 (Recommendation 15). The ASTHO, NACHO, and USCLHO con-
sider that both health care providers and health departments have a privilege to disclose to
partners, but recommended that the notification be performed by health departments as they
have the expertise and the resources. See Guide, supra note 227, at 14.
278. Report, supra note 276.
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addressing the issue of confidentiality. 7 9 The House of Delegates,
however, also passed Substitute Resolution 18, which stated that the
AMA should address, through the Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, the patient confidentiality and ethical issues raised by known
HIV positive patients who refuse to inform their sexual partners or
modify their behavior.280
The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the AMA duly
considered these matters and published its findings. 281 The Council
stated that in those jurisdictions in which the reporting of individuals
with the AIDS virus to public health authorities is not mandated, a
physician should attempt to persuade the infected individual to re-
frain from activities that might result in further transmission of the
disease.2 2 Should rational persuasion fail, the physician should then
notify the public health authorities, which would normally be the
furthest extent to which a physician would be obligated to go.28 In-
terestingly, however, the Council thought that a physician would
have a residual duty to warn unsuspecting third parties whenever the
authorities take no action.284 Presumably, the Council would wish to
place limitations on this latter obligation, although it did not state
any. Can it really be considered the duty of the physician to discover
whether the authorities have taken any steps in the requisite
direction?
Despite the uncertainties, the AMA does appear to endorse the
existence of a right to be warned in unsuspecting third parties. In-
deed, the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs stated that "in un-
usual circumstances, when all else fails, a physician may have a
common law duty to warn endangered third parties. ' 28" This is in
contrast to the Board of Trustees' report, which urged states to enact
statutes exempting physicians from liability for failure to warn third
parties. However, the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs would
recognize a residual physician duty only when the state does not re-
quire the reporting of seropositive individuals. Specifically, no obliga-
tion would arise in cases of full-blown AIDS, which are reportable in
all states.
279. Goldsmith, AMA House of Delegates Adopts Comprehensive Measures on AIDS,
258 J. A.M.A. 425-26 (1987).
280. Id. at 426.
281. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues Involved in the Growing
AIDS Crisis, 259 J. A.M.A. 1360-61 (1988).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1361.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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The notion that contact tracing will frequently be the physi-
cian's task in states that do not require the reporting of HIV positive
test results, but will be the public health agency's function in cases
of AIDS, seems misplaced unless warnings are to be regarded as
part of a collaborative effort between the physicians and authorities.
Such a notion appears to say simply that if no duty to report exists,
in some cases no warning will occur unless the physician acts. Surely
if public health officials are the best persons to carry out the notifica-
tion process, the answer is for the state to mandate the reporting of
HIV antibody test results.
Currently, however, the majority of states do not have such a
reporting requirement and so a vacuum exists. 86 It is quite foresee-
able that a common law duty to warn would be found to exist by the
courts, possibly even when a state statute mandated the confidential-
ity of AIDS-related information but did not specifically outlaw
warnings to third parties.2 87 It is not desirable, though, that duties
arise by default. Physicians cannot adequately correlate the gains de-
rived by contact tracing efforts across a locality and in some ar-
eas-for example, high risk urban areas such as San Francisco or
New York-might be physically unable to warn in all cases in which
a duty to warn arose. The implicit trust that exists between patient
and physician is also likely to be seriously, and further undermined
by such warnings, regardless of the circumstances.
The idea that warnings to third parties ought to be discretionary
at the hands of either physicians or public health authorities is one
current trend in state statutes.288 Such policies do not clearly desig-
nate primary responsibility or duties, and thus cannot even be viewed
as a collaborative prevention strategy. Interestingly, the Presidential
Commission on the HIV Epidemic would clearly place the primary
burden and responsibility upon local and state public health depart-
ments and merely supplement this by permitting physicians the op-
tion of warning third parties.2 89 In practice, this might work in more
collaborative fashion and might create more comprehensive coverage
in terms of warnings, in the same way a duty to warn placed upon
physicians certainly would.
286. See Dickens, supra note 260, at 3451 (While every state requires reporting of
AIDS cases, only "a number of states require reporting of positive HIV-antibody test
results.").
287. Id. at 3449. See also Hirsh, AIDS and the Law: A Summary and Conclusion, 10 J.
LEG. MED. 169, 181 (1989).
288. Examples are South Carolina, Georgia, California, Connecticut, and New York.
289. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 128-29.
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IX. Conclusion
The pace of legislative activity and change in the states is quick-
ening. In 1988, 700 bills were introduced in forty-two states, and 136
AIDS-related laws were passed in thirty-six states. 290 Over 170 stat-
utes have now been passed concerning AIDS, spanning every state in
the U.S. and the District of Columbia. 291 The main thrust of most
of this legislation was state encouragement of voluntary testing and
counselling premised on written, informed consent. Many bills were
introduced that provided for quarantining of infected individuals,
mandatory testing, and criminal sanctions, but few were actually
passed.292 By contrast, state legislation providing for contact tracing
by public health officials is growing steadily. Furthermore, permis-
sive provisions for disclosure by physicians to contacts of infected
persons have multiplied significantly. Ten states passed such laws in
1988 alone.293
Federal legislation in the form of a House of Representatives
bill, entitled the AIDS Federal Policy Act of 1988, contained confi-
dentiality provisions, but also permitted disclosure of test results of
HIV infected individuals by physicians to sexual and IV drug use
partners or contacts of the individual294 if the physician/counselor
reasonably believed that the patient would not inform those persons
himself and that the disclosure was medically appropriate. 2 5 The
legislation that was finally passed did not contain these provisions
relating to confidentiality, but this was not purely because of the
merits or demerits of those particular provisions. 290 Legislation con-
taining similar provisions can be anticipated in the future, particu-
larly since the Presidential Commission on the HIV Epidemic has
made recommendations along these lines to the President. 97 The re-
port of the Commission recommended that physicians have the dis-
cretion, but not a duty, to warn sexual partners at risk,29 and that
290. AIDS Policy Center, InterGovernmental Health Policy Project, George Washing-
ton Univ., 1989. See also AIDS Issues Continue to be Addressed by State Legislation, Am.
MED. NEWS, June 16, 1989, at 5 [hereinafter AIDS Issues].
291. See Gostin, supra note 77, at 1621.
292. AIDS Issues, supra note 290, at 5.
293. Id.
294. H.R. 5142, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. H8076, H8081 (1988).
295. Id.
296. AMA Played Key Role in New AIDS Bill, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 4, 1988, at 19.
Legislative time pressure contributed to their omission. See id.
297. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 129. This body has been succeeded by
the National Commission on AIDS, which was created by the Health Omnibus Programs
Extension Act of 1988.
298. Id. at 128-29.
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public health departments initiate partner notification programs to
implement their obligation to warn third parties of exposure to the
virus."'
A bill introduced in the Pennsylvania legislature is a direct re-
sult of the report of the PBA Task Force on AIDS, and is supported
by the Pennsylvania branch of the American Civil Liberties
Union. °0 Although the bill provides for the the confidentiality of
HIV-related information, generally the bill would allow physicians
the discretion to disclose such information to sex or needle-sharing
partners of the test subject. 1 Disclosure would be permissible only
when the physician: (1) reasonably believes disclosure is medically
appropriate, and there is a significant risk of future infection to the
contact; (2) has counselled the subject regarding the need to notify
and reasonably believes the subject will not himself inform the con-
tact or abstain from sexual or needle-sharing behavior that poses a
significant risk of infection to the contact; (3) has informed the sub-
ject of his or her intent to make such disclosure; and (4) will not
disclose the identity of the subject or any other contact.302 The bill
specifically refers to known contacts and states that a physician has
no duty to identify, locate, or notify a contact. The bill also grants
immunity from suit arising from disclosure or nondisclosure. 303
Now that such legislative trends are clearly emerging, the time
is ripe for an appraisal of state confidentiality and disclosure policies.
The current prevalent permissive policies certainly extricate physi-
cians from a tricky legal dilemma and give effect to the request from
the AMA for legal immunity for physicians.30 Granting public
health departments discretion, rather than imposing a duty, in rela-
tion to contact tracing or partner notification not only appears desir-
able, but seems wholly inevitable, unless a limitation based on re-
source availability is built into the statutory scheme. Even if follow-
up or investigation of each case is made obligatory, it would be un-
reasonable to mandate contact tracing in all cases. 05 Public health
budgets would have to be utilized almost solely on this one strategy.
Ironically though, this flexible and accommodating framework
is arguably the feature that undermines the objective of preventing
299. Id. at 75-76.
300. S. 1163, Printer's No. 1435, 173d Gen. Assembly. 1st Sess. (1989).
301. Id. § 7.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See Report, supra note 276, at 2103 (Recommendations 15, 16).
305. New Hampshire has in fact enacted such a compromise. See supra notes 234-36
and accompanying text.
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the spread of the disease. A comprehensive approach is required in
order to achieve any significant effect. Relying on an individual phy-
sician's judgment is unlikely to result in comprehensiveness of cover-
age or utility. 06 Public health authorities are more likely than physi-
cians to be able to achieve completeness of coverage since public
authorities will be acting in compliance with a general policy. Even
then, this is not feasible in cases involving large numbers of individu-
als (i.e., high risk populations in large urban areas) apart from
which such persons are not unsuspecting of risks of exposure or
available measures to reduce risks. Thus far, the only ostensibly suc-
cessful public health contact tracing programs have involved low risk
groups, such as heterosexual partners in San Francisco, or high risk
groups in rural areas, such as gay men in South Carolina. 07 Even if
programs were developed only in relation to limited populations, or
only more limited risk groups were prioritized, arguably the damage
done to the voluntary testing process greatly outweighs any likely
benefits. While self-notification by the infected individual to contacts
is desirable, even when public officials assist the individual in the
process of notification, any element of coercion is likely to be self-
defeating. Individuals cannot be compelled to reveal contacts or pre-
vented from going underground. Moreover, it seems that any chink
in the armor of physician-patient confidentiality is likely to have an
effect elsewhere, unless it is clearly accepted by all as necessary and
desirable.
Some states, although granting lip service to the confidentiality
of AIDS-related information, have enacted long lists of exceptions to
the general rule.308 As Gostin said, "Legislation .. .can . ..seri-
ously inhibit health efforts . . . by enacting a patchwork quilt of ex-
ceptions to the principle of confidentiality."3 9 Potential testees possi-
bly will be dissuaded from obtaining a voluntary HIV test if the
strictest possible confidentiality is not the prevailing overall atmo-
sphere and policy.
Although duties to warn placed upon physicians by the common
law seem onerous, these imposed duties are better designed to
achieve the ultimate public health goals than powers to notify. Du-
ties to warn would also avoid uncertainty in physicians' minds about
their precise legal obligations, especially when state laws provide
306. Providing immunity against liability for nondisclosure may even create a disincen-
tive to making a disclosure.
307. See AIDS Initiative, supra note 243, at 37.
308. Georgia, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin are examples.
309. See Gostin, supra note 77, at 1621.
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that warnings are discretionary, but fail to state explicitly any im-
munity against a cause of action based on a failure to disclose.""0
When there is no statutory duty on physicians to report cases of pos-
itive HIV tests, as is the case in slightly more than half of the states,
physician notification may supplement public health officials' disclo-
sures in reportable AIDS cases. In fact, an alternative mandatory
physician duty to warn was noted by the United States House of
Representatives during discussion of the House AIDS Bill during the
previous session of Congress. 3"
While it would be my contention that mandatory duties to dis-
close are preferable to mere powers to notify in the case of physi-
cians, and that notification by public health officials is preferable to
notification by physicians in almost all cases, nevertheless any one of
these policies is ultimately likely to be deleterious to the public
health effort. The cooperation of high risk groups is vital to the
ongoing general strategy. Strict confidentiality will ensure such coop-
eration. Although a right to know of contacts is attractive, the pa-
tient's right to confidentiality should take precedence.
As the Presidential Commission stated in its Report on the HIV
Epidemic:
Rigorous maintenance of confidentiality is considered critical to
the success of the public health endeavor to prevent the trans-
mission and spread of HIV infection. Current public health
strategies for fighting the spread of HIV infection are entirely
dependent on voluntary cooperation. To encourage individuals to
come forward voluntarily for necessary testing, counseling and
treatment, our health care system must be viewed with confi-
dence and trust by those in need of its services.81 2
Testing for HIV infection on a voluntary basis is a central part of
the public health effort, an indispensable and non-substitutable ele-
ment. Such testing allows for the early treatment of persons infected
with the virus and for the collection of data relating to the preva-
lence and epidemiology of the disease, allowing a well-targeted, ef-
fective and resource efficient utilization of public health efforts. In
addition, counselling that accompanies testing is an essential part of
the behavior modification reinforcement program (supplementing
and complementing general educational measures) for risk reduc-
310. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
311. 134 CONG. REC. H8073-74 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1988) (amendment proposed by
Rep. McCollum).
312. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 126.
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tion, as well as an opportunity to encourage self, or assisted, notifica-
tion of contacts. Strict confidentiality of test results and anonymous
reporting to state health departments will probably increase the
number of those tested, and improve the value of available data and
enhance the opportunities to encourage other prevention techniques.
One source has estimated that truly confidential voluntary HIV test-
ing could prevent hundreds or even thousands of cases of AIDS dur-
ing a five to fifteen year period in a high risk population of
100,000.313
Despite the slow start, general educational efforts, and those
targeted at certain high-risk groups, do appear to be having a signifi-
cant impact. The available evidence indicates that the spread of HIV
has slowed in almost all populations in the U.S., the prime exception
being the IV drug use community. 1 Contact tracing or partner no-
tification is likely to be an ineffectual technique to combat the spread
of the disease among IV drug users. There is also evidence of a gen-
eral reduction in high-risk behaviors among men in some communi-
ties, based on self-reported changes.15
States, such as Pennsylvania, which have no statute regulating
confidentiality and disclosure regarding AIDS, extend an open invi-
tation to courts to expand common law powers or duties from osten-
sibly analogous areas. When a physician warns a potential third
party victim, and the patient brings an action against the physician
on the basis of breach of confidentiality, a court could quite possibly
discover a power to disclose. 16 When the physician failed to make
any disclosure to such a party, it is equally possible that a court
would find a duty to warn by analogy to the Tarasoff line of cases?37
Even in Pennsylvania, where the courts have taken a greater interest
in the confidentiality of physician-patient relationships than most
state courts, such scenarios are quite probable.1
313. These are the predictions of Dr. Mitchell Gail, a medical statistician at the Na-
tional Cancer Institute, presented to an annual meeting of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science. See Confidential Testing Could Prevent AIDS, AM. MED. NEWS,
Jan. 27, 1989, at 6. A mathematical model for epidemics was used to arrive at these conclu-
sions. Id.
314. AIDS Initiative, supra note 243, at 37.
315. Self-Reported Changes in Sexual Behaviors Among Homosexual and Bisexual
Men from the San Francisco City Clinic Cohort, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.
187-89 (1987).
316. Courts that were so inclined would find support from cases such as Simonsen v.
Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920), in the field of sexually transmitted diseases.
See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
318. In Pennsylvania, courts have identified a federal constitutional basis for the right of
confidentiality as well as a state constitutional basis. See, e.g., In re B, 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d
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If Pennsylvania courts, however, were to turn to sources of legis-
lative intent for guidance, the courts might reach a different conclu-
sion in the AIDS instance. There is a state statute strictly protecting
the confidentiality of pre-marital syphilis test results.319 Mental
health records held by the state,320 and medical records generally, 21
are declared to be confidential. In the Tarasoff context, many courts
looked to state privilege statutes to see if an exception exists that
might be applicable in the dangerous mental patient context. 22
In Tarasoff, a duty toward the victim was justified partially by
the existence of a loophole in the relevant privilege statute that gov-
erned the situation.23 In Pennsylvania, although the physician-pa-
tient privilege statute is fairly narrow, being essentially targeted at
potentially defamatory material, it would nevertheless appear to be
applicable to information that a person has AIDS, ARC, or the HIV
virus, because of the stigma such an imputation carries. 324 A psy-
chologist-patient privilege statute enacted shortly after Leedy v.
Hartnett"2 5 is also very strict in its terms.320
It is suggested that the strict confidentiality of test results is a
vital prerequisite to a successful public health campaign against the
disease. Pennsylvania should consider enacting a scheme that pro-
vides exclusively for the anonymity of HIV test results and anony-
mous reporting of seropositive individuals to the state department of
health. The evidence from studies and surveys in Oregon, South Car-
olina, and San Francisco suggest that name reporting of seropositive
419 (1978). In Hopewell v. Adebimpe, 129 Pitt. L.J. 35, 37 (1981), the court stated that the
duty of confidentiality was absolute. But see Leedy v. Hartnett, 510 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Pa.
1981).
319. 28 PA. CODE § 27.92 (1987).
320. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7111 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
321. 28 PA. CODE § 103.22(b)(4) (1982).
322. In Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718, 415 A.2d 625 (1980), the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals declined to apply the Tarasoff doctrine to that jurisdiction -partly
because of the absence of a pertinent exception in the state privilege statute.
323. The California Evidence Code contained an exception to the general duty of confi-
dentiality in its privilege statute, which provided that there "should be no privilege under this
article if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is . . .dangerous
to himself or to the person or property of another and that disclosure of the communication is
necessary to prevent the threatened danger." See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1024 (West 1966).
324. The statute reads: "No physician shall be allowed, in any civil matter, to disclose
any information which he acquired in attending the patient in a professional capacity, and
which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, which shall tend to blacken the
character of the patient, without the consent of said patient, except in civil matters brought by
such patient for damages on account of personal injuries." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5929
(Purdon 1982).
325. 510 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Pa. 1981).
326. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5944 (Purdon 1982). Article 1, section I of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution also states that among the "inherent rights of mankind" is "acquiring,
possessing and protecting property and reputation."
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individuals is associated with decreased testing of those who are
most at risk of exposure to HIV. 327 The Colorado experience sug-
gests to the contrary, but may be explained by specific factors pecu-
liar to that jurisdiction.3 2 8 Such a statutory policy may, however, be
inevitably less successful than anticipated, and public health efforts
hampered, by the bewildering array of approaches currently adopted
by the states. As the Presidential Commission on the HIV Epidemic
recognized, a consistent approach across all states is a necessary pre-
condition of any nationally successful program . 29 The slowly crys-
tallizing consensus among the states is, unfortunately, undermining
its own likelihood of success by the confidentiality loopholes that
have been enacted, including those relating to physician and public
health notification.
Should states continue to favor partner notification schemes, it
would seem sensible to confine the policy to heterosexual (probably
females of childbearing age only) and unsuspecting partners of mem-
bers of high risk groups (e.g., spouses of bisexual males). Although
the risk of transmission of the virus to such persons is relatively
low,330 it is still very significant and increases with every sexual act
undertaken. 331 Although to date the numbers of heterosexual, non-
IV drug user individuals who have developed AIDS remains small
compared to other high risk populations, this population is growing
significantly, and cannot be ignored. 3 2 This limited infringement of
the duty of confidentiality might have only a minimal deterrent ef-
327. Krajeski, Names of HIV Seropositive People Shouldn't Be Reported, AM. MED.
NEWS, May 19, 1989, at 33. There is additional evidence that offering anonymous testing
encourages members of certain high risk groups to present for testing. See Fehrs, Fleming,
Foster, McAlister, Fox, Modesitt & Conrad, Trial of Anonymous Versus Confidential Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Testing, THE LANCET, Aug. 13, 1988, at 379-81. See also Ohi, Hase-
gawa, Kai, Inaba, Miyama, Kamakura, Terao, Hirano, Kobayashi, Muramatsu, Ashizawa,
Uemura & Niimi, Notification of HIV Carriers: Possible Effect on Uptake of AIDS Testing,
THE LANCET, Oct. 22, 1988, at 947-48.
328. Krajeski, supra note 327, at 33. In the past, the state has permitted false names to
be reported and currently has very strict confidentiality provisions attaching to HIV test
results.
329. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 127. The Commission considered that
the lack of uniformity among the states relating to confidentiality causes confusion and arbi-
trary consequences, and prevents the establishment of an effective national confidentiality pol-
icy. Id.
330. A recent report assessed the risk of contagion following unprotected sexual inter-
course with an infected partner as one in 500; one study concluded that the risk to a woman of
contracting the virus through heterosexual acts was approximately 23%. See Padian, Marquis,
Francis, Anderson, Rutherford, O'Malley & Winkelstein, Male to Female Transmission of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 258 J. A.M.A. 788 (1987).
331. See AIDS. Confidentiality, supra note 149, at 70-71.
332. See Public Health Service, PHS Plan for Prevention and Control of AIDS and the
AIDS Virus, 101 PUB. HEALTH REP. 341 (1988); Gibofsky & Laurence, supra note 2.
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fect on voluntary testing since stable partners in such relationships
can be expected to preserve the confidentiality of such information in
most cases. It might also be possible to involve physicians in such
limited partner notification. Furthermore, disclosures in such cases
may be viewed as simply part of the concept of marital privilege, the
right of a spouse to be made aware of the medical condition of his or
her partner.33 To be successful the limited reach of the confidential-
ity exception should be made known to patients and observed rigor-
ously by physicians. 34
Even so, such a limited exception may be too high a price to pay
when dealing with a disease that is anticipated to kill 55,000 people
in 1991 alone. 3 5 The primary responsibility rests with the individual,
assisted to the best degree possible by health care professionals and
state agencies. The law already clearly places obligations on persons
to warn partners of the risk they expose themselves to by engaging in
sexual acts with that infected individual.33 If a particular group, for
example, heterosexual partners of bisexual men, are regarded as be-
ing especially vulnerable, general educational efforts ought to be
made to reach such targeted individuals. To date, the heterosexual
community has been a poor partner to the homosexual community
regarding such educational campaigns. The plight of the identifiable,
personalized victim is difficult to ignore. Yet, the probably much
larger numbers of potential or statistical victims deserve equal atten-
tion. Protection of these unknowables will likely produce the most
effective long-term public health strategy to defeat this evil in our
midst. The observations of the Presidential Commission can be
viewed as particularly instructive in this area. The Commission
noted, "The perception that confidentiality may be breached is keep-
333. In Mikel v. Abrams, 541 F. Supp. 591 (W.D. Miss. 1982), the court held that a
disclosure of medical information about a male patient to his wife did not amount to a breach
of confidentiality because of the marital privilege involved. In Joseph DiMarco v. Lynch
Homes-Chester County, Inc., 18 Phila. 212 (1987), there was no duty to warn a third party
sexual partner of the patient when the latter contracted hepatitis. The court stated, however,
that a duty to warn might have arisen if the parties had been married at the time.
334. See Gillett, AIDS and Confidentiality, 4 J. App. PHIL. 15, 20 (1987).
335. TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 8 (assessment based on CDC estimates).
336. Only recently, a Los Angeles jury awarded $14.5 million to Rock Hudson's lover,
Marc Christian, for failing to warn him that he was suffering from AIDS. Los Angeles Times,
Feb. 16, 1989, at 1, 31. In Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr.
273 (1984), liability was imposed for the knowing transmission of genital herpes through sex-
ual activity. See generally Comment, You Never Told Me ... You Never Asked: Tort Liabil-
ity for the Sexual Transmission of AIDS, 91 DICK. L. REV. 529 (1986). See also Hermann,
AIDS: Malpractice and Transmission Liability, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 63 (1986-87); Baruch,
AIDS in the Courts: Tort Liability for the Sexual Transmission of Acquired Immune Defi-
ciency Syndrome, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 165 (1987).
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ing people who believe that they have been exposed to the virus from
seeking testing and counselling services. 887 The Commission also
stated that "[t]here appears to be a lack of confidence that the confi-
dentiality of HIV-related information will be maintained regardless
of the law. Many perceive confidentiality protection as lacking, even
where adequate safeguards exist." 38 In light of these findings, it is
essential that the very strictest confidentiality be mandated, as well
as observed, even to the point in many cases of ensuring anonymity.
Any "exceptions" threaten the integrity of the general strategy. Con-
fidentiality is about maintaining peoples' confidences, in all the
meanings of that term.
337. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 74.
338. Id. at 127.

